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CRIMINAL LAW-THE INSUFFICIENCY OF POSSESSION IN PROHI­
BITION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTES: WHY VIEWING A 
CRIME SCENE SHOULD BE CRIMINAL 
INTRODUCTION 
To a child whose sexual exploitation is captured on film and 
uploaded to the Internet, the distinction between whether an online 
user possesses the photographs or is merely viewing them is imma­
terial. That child's victimization began with the sexual act,! contin­
ued through the photography session, and continues on today 
as photographs of the molestation float through cyberspace, free­
ly accessible to anyone who has the ability to surf the Web.2 
Yet, the distinction between possessing and viewing is highly 
significant to police, prosecutors, defendants, and judges.3 De­
spite the Supreme Court's decision in Osborne v. Ohio,4 which 
held a prohibition against viewing child pornography to be con­
stitutional,s the federal statute and most state statutes criminal­
ize only "knowing possession"6 or "knowing possession or con­
1. EVA J. KLAIN ET AL., ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW FOR THE NAT'L 
CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: THE CRIMINAL­
JUSTICE-SYSTEM RESPONSE 8 (2001), available at http://www.missingkids.comJen_US/ 
publicationslNC81.pdf; see also Michelle K. Collins, Child Pornography: A Closer 
Look, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 2007, www.policechiefmagazine.org (follow "Archives Past 
Issues" hyperlink; then follow "March 2001" hyperlink). 
2. PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE IN­
TERNET 3 (2001); Collins, supra note 1. 
3. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 5-6 (2005) 
("Anyone who has ever practiced law knows that the real issues of a case-its gut, how 
it plays on the street-are one thing; the legal issues, into which these real issues must 
somehow be shoehorned, are commonly another."). 
4. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
5. [d. at 111. 
6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2) (2000) ("Any person who ... 
knowingly possesses any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or 
any other material that contains an image of child pornography ... shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both." (emphasis added)); ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-12-192(b) (LexisNexis 2007) ("Any person who knowingly possesses any obscene 
matter that contains a visual depiction of a person under the age of 17 years engaged in 
any act of sado-masochistic abuse, sexual intercourse, sexual excitement, masturbation, 
genital nudity, or other sexual conduct shall be guilty of a Class C felony." (emphasis 
added)). 
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trol."7 The knowledge requirement in these possession statutes8 re­
quires that prosecutors either prove that a defendant did more than 
merely view child pornography9-regardless of how often he 
viewed it or how grotesque the contentlO-or suggests to judges 
that they perform questionable legal gymnastics in order to 
convict.ll 
In Massachusetts, the child pornography statute only prohibits 
knowing purchase and possession.12 This Note explores how courts 
7. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-403(3)(b.5) (West 2004) ("A person 
commits sexual exploitation of a child if, for any purpose, he or she knowingly ... 
{pJossesses or controls any sexually exploitative material." (emphasis added)). 
8. All statutes that prohibit possession require "knowing possession." See, e.g., 
statutes cited supra notes 5-6. This mens rea requirement means that the defendant 
must "knowingly cause[] a particular result or knowingly engage[] in specified con­
duct." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 125 (3d ed. 2001). In 
terms of possession of child pornography, knowing possession requires that the defen­
dant know that what he possesses is child pornography as opposed to, for example, 
adult pornography. The two terms-possession and knowing possession-are used in­
terchangeably throughout this Note. 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 924-26 (8th Cir. 2002) (uphold­
ing the district court's acquittal of the defendant despite the 1007 files found in his 
internet browser cache, which included photographs of girls in bondage from websites 
like www.lolitahardcore.com and www.hairless·lolita.com). 
10. A common misconception about child pornography is that its victims are pri­
marily older teenagers who appear younger than they actually are. Collins, supra note 
1. In fact, one study found that the average age of victims is thirteen, with ages ranging 
from six to seventeen. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; see also Donna Andrea Rosen­
berg, Unusual Forms of Child Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD 441, 431 (Mary Edna 
Helfer, Ruth S. Kempe & Richard D. Krugman eds., 5th ed. 1997). Another study 
found that of children who were identified, fifty·eight percent were prepubescent and 
six percent were infants. See Collins, supra note 1. What one author describes as the 
"starter kit" for newcomers to child pornography is a series of photographs of a boy and 
a girl, Gavin and Helena, who appear to be seven. In those photographs, they are 
having sex with each other and with Helena's father. JENKINS, supra note 2, at 2. Jen­
kins cites an online viewer who exclaims that these photographs are" 'the greatest HC 
(hard-core) series ever made! [Helena has been] "acting" since she was a toddler until 
she was twelve years old, which means there are thousands of pics of her in action out 
there somewhere!'" Id. Another popular series are the KX photographs, which depict 
kindergarten-age girls performing oral sex on men. These were taken in the 1990s and 
still circulate widely on the Internet. Id. at 2-3. 
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 174-75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007) (finding the defendant guilty of possession and control of child pornography be­
cause, while he was looking at images on websites, "he had the ability to download the 
images, print them, copy them, or email them to others," even though he did not exer­
cise his ability), appeal granted, 939 A.2d 290 (Pa. 2007). 
12. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29C (2006). The statute reads: 
Whoever knowingly purchases or possesses a negative, slide, book, maga­
zine, film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual reproduction, or de­
piction by computer, of any child whom the person knows or reasonably 
should know to be under the age of 18 years of age and such child is: 
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are construing their state statutes and the federal statute to convict 
defendants who viewed online visual depictions without download­
ing them and whether those methods would be effective in Massa­
chusetts. This Note argues that Massachusetts's possession statute 
is ineffective in satisfying the apparent intent of its drafters to ban 
child pornographyP To comply with the legislative intent, the 
Massachusetts statute must expressly prohibit the viewing of child 
pornography. 
The background sections of this Note, Parts I-V, will begin 
with an explanation of what constitutes child pornography, includ­
ing the effect it has on its victims and how the Internet has im­
pacted access to it. It will then discuss Supreme Court decisions 
and federal laws that first criminalized the possession of child por­
nography. This Note will explore the federal statute that prohibits 
possession and state statutes that prohibit possession, control, and 
(i) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of sexual intercourse with 
any person or animal; 
(ii) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of sexual contact involv­
ing the sex organs of the child and the mouth, anus or sex organs of the child 
and the sex organs of another person or animal; 
(iii) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of masturbation; 
(iv) actually or by simulation portrayed as being the object of, or other­
wise engaged in, any act of lewd fondling, touching, or caressing involving an­
other person or animal; 
(v) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of excretion or urination 
within a sexual context; or 
(vi) actually or by simulation portrayed or depicted as bound, fettered, or 
subject to sadistic, masochistic, or sadomasochistic abuse in any sexual con­
text; or 
(vii) depicted or portrayed in any pose, posture or setting involving a 
lewd exhibition of the unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such per­
son is female, a fully or partially developed breast of the child; with knowledge 
of the nature or content thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not more than five years or in a jail or house of correction for 
not more than two and one-half years or by a fine of not less than $1,000 nor 
more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment for the first offense, 
not less than five years in a state prison or by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor 
more than $20,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment for the second of­
fense, not less than 10 years in a state prison or by a fine of not less than 
$10,000 nor more than $30,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment for the 
third and subsequent offenses. 
13. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, ch. 181, 1997 Mass. Acts 1034 (punishing the crime of 
child pornography and stating, "to stop the sexual abuse and exploitation of children, it 
is necessary to ban the possession of any sexually exploitative materials"); see also 
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067, 1074 (Mass. 2002) (stating, in a case inter­
preting the phrase "visual depiction by computer," that "[0lur reading comports with 
the Legislature's expressed design to eliminate permanent records of sexually exploitive 
material harmful to children"). 
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viewing of child pornography. It will then look at how courts in 
states other than Massachusetts have ruled in child pornography 
possession cases. It will conclude with a discussion of the Massa­
chusetts statute and cases that have challenged it. 
The Analysis portion of the Note, Part VI, will begin with an 
explanation of why viewing is a separate and distinct act from pos­
session in Massachusetts. It will examine Massachusetts's definition 
of constructive possession and its statutory interpretation require­
ments. It will conclude that, under the current statute, people who 
view child pornography in Massachusetts are not violating the law 
as it is written. Further, it will suggest that technological advance­
ments are outpacing the child pornography statute and are render­
ing its prohibitions incomplete. Finally, it will suggest how 
Massachusetts can bring the statute in line with the legislature's 
stated intent of ending child sexual exploitation by criminalizing 
viewing of child pornography,14 
I. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
A. Defining Child Pornography 
Generally, pornography is defined as "material (as books or a 
photograph) that depicts erotic behavior and is intended to cause 
sexual excitement."15 Child pornography consists of "images that 
sexually exploit children."16 Before photography was introduced in 
1839, child pornography consisted of explicit drawings and paint­
ings of minorsP With the camera, and with each new form of tech­
nology, the media in which child pornography are available have 
increased.18 Today, child pornography may be depicted in photo­
graphs, videos, interactive CD-ROMs, and even live footage 
through videoconferencing.19 
14. See infra Part V.A.2. 
15. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICfIONARY 966 (11th ed. 2005) [herein­
after MERRIAM-WEBSTER'Sj. 
16. Candace Kim, From Fantasy to Reality: The Link Between Viewing Child Por­
nography and Molesting Children, PROSECUTOR, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 17, 17, available at 
39-APR Prosecutor 17 (Westlaw). 
17. Robert W. ten Bensel, Marguerite M. Rheinberger & Samuel X. Radbill, 
Children in a World of Violence: The Roots of Child Maltreatment, in THE BATTERED 
CHILD, supra note 10, at 3, 14. 
18. Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 432 ("It is something of a universal phenomenon 
that technologies are employed in child abuse almost from the moment they become 
available. "). 
19. Id.; see also Kurt Eichenwald, Through His Webcam, a Boy Joins a Sordid 
Online World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at AI. 
821 2008] WHY VIEWING A CRIME SCENE SHOULD BE CRIMINAL 
Under federal law, child pornography is broadly defined to in­
clude all visual depictions of minors engaged in "sexually explicit 
conduct."20 State statutory definitions vary,21 but, generally, visual 
depictions of children performing sexual acts, naked in sexualized 
poses, or engaging in any "sexually suggestive" behavior meet the 
standard of child pornography.22 
20. 18 U.S.c.A. § 2256(8)(A)-(C) (West 2007). The statute states: 

"[C]hild pornography" means any visual depiction, including any photograph, 

film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, 

whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexu­

ally explicit conduct, where­
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 
(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or com­
puter-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or 
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to ap­
pear that an identifiable minor is cngaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
Id. 
21. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-2(1) (2003). The statute states: 
"Child pornography" means any visual depiction, including any live perform­
ance, photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated im­
age or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other 
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where: 
(a) the production of the visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 
(b) the visual depiction is of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con­
duct; or 
(c) the visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear 
that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
Id.; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 573.010(2) (West 2003) (defining child pornography as "[a]ny 
obscene material or performance depicting sexual conduct, sexual contact, or a sexual 
performance ... and which has as one of its participants or portrays as an observer of 
such conduct, contact, or performance a child under the age of eighteen"); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-6-403(2)(j) (West 2004) ('''Sexually exploitative material' means any 
photograph, motion picture, videotape, print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, 
electronically, chemically, or digitally reproduced visual material that depicts a child 
engaged in, participating in, observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct."). Ex­
plicit sexual conduct is further defined as "sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, erotic 
nudity, masturbation, sadomasochism, or sexual excitement." Id. § 18-6-403(2)(e). 
22. JENKINS, supra note 2, at 37; see also ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, SEXUAL ABUSE 
OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECfIVE 62 (1999). Images produced with com­
puter-imaging techniques are the exception. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 
U.S. 234, 256 (2002) (narrowing the Child Pornography Prevention Act's definition of 
prohibited images to exclude "virtual child pornography," in which photo-like images 
of children being sexually exploited are produced with computer-imaging techniques 
and no actual children are used in the creation of the images); see also David B. John­
son, Comment, Why the Possession of Computer-Generated Child Pornography Can Be 
Constitutionally Prohibited, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 311, 314-16 (1994) (describing the 
technology used to create virtual child pornography); Sarah Sternberg, Note, The Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 and the First Amendment: Virtual Antitheses, 69 
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In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court distinguished child 
pornography from adult pornography by eliminating the need for a 
finding that the material is obscene.23 The 1982 ruling claimed that 
the relevant measure in determining whether an image constitutes 
child pornography is whether a child was "physically or psychologi­
cally" harmed in the creation of the work.24 The Supreme Court 
stated that "a sexually explicit depiction need not be 'patently of­
fensive' in order to have required the sexual exploitation of a child 
for its production."25 Because the state's interest is in prosecuting 
the promoter of child-sexual exploitation, the threshold question is 
not what the final product looks like, but whether a child was sexu­
ally exploited in the creation of the material.26 Recognizing First 
Amendment principles, the Court imposed a limiting measure27 
that required child pornography statutes to include a list of specifi­
.cally proscribed activities within their definitions.28 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2783, 2788 (2001) (describing the morphing process in which a 
child's head and a pornographic photograph of an adult are morphed together to create 
an image of child pornography). 
23. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). In Miller v. California, the 
Supreme Court created a standard for identifying obscene images: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan­
dards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted). In Ferber, the Court 
held that images involving children did not have to meet this standard to be child por­
nography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764; see also Mark S. Silver, Note, Rethinking Harm and 
Pornography: Conflicting Personal and Community Views, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 
171, 192 (2002); Sternberg, supra note 22, at 2792. 
24. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 764. 
28. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c.A. § 2256(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (West 2007). The statute defines 
"sexually explicit conduct" depicted in child pornography as: 
(i) graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, 
or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or lascivious simu­
lated sexual intercourse where the genitals, breast, or pubic area of any person is 
exhibited; 
(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated; 
(I) bestiality; 
(II) masturbation; or 
(III) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or 
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
person. 
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B. Immortalizing a Crime Scene 
Child pornography was not generally considered a form of 
child abuse until the mid-1970s.29 Today, a visual depiction of the 
sexual exploitation of a child is understood to be a photograph of a 
crime scene.30 Children who are the subjects of child pornography 
are impacted both by the criminal sexual abuse that occurs while 
the photographs are taken and by the additional impact of the exis­
tence of the pornography itself.31 Because the images exist online 
indefinitely, "[p ]hysical, psychological, and emotional effects of 
child sexual abuse are coupled with the possibility of the pornogra­
phy resurfacing."32 For her entire life,33 the victim lives with the 
Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1103 (2007). Delaware's statute states that a '''Prohib­
ited sexual act'" includes: 
(1) Sexual intercourse; 
(2) Anal intercourse; 
(3) Masturbation; 
(4) Bestiality; 
(5) Sadism; 
(6) Masochism; 
(7) Fellatio; 
(8) Cunnilingus; 
(9) Nudity, if such nudity is to be depicted for the purpose of the sexual stimu­
lation or the sexual gratification of any individual who may view such depiction; 
(10) Sexual contact; 
(11) Lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any child; 
(12) Any other act which is intended to be a depiction or simulation of any act 
described in this subsection. 
Id. 
29. JENKINS, supra note 2, at 32-33. 
30. Susan S. Kreston, Emerging Issues in Internet Child Pornography Cases: Bal­
ancing Acts, J. INTERNET L., June 2006, at 22, 26; see also LEVESQUE, supra note 22, at 
65; Kim, supra note 16, at 20. 
31. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 10. One author notes: 
While little is known about the specific long-term effects of use in child por­
nography, the immediate trauma and effects of sexual abuse on children is 
well documented. Because child pornography is a clear record of child sex 
abuse, its victims would therefore experience the same emotional and physical 
consequences in addition to any harm resulting from the pornography. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
32. Id. at 11; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) ("[T]he materials 
produced by child pornographers permanently record the victim's abuse. The pornog­
raphy's continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the 
children in years to come."). 
33. Although child pornography features both girls and boys, about half of all 
pornography cases involve only girls. The other half involves boys and girls together or 
boys alone. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. 
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awareness that, at any given moment, a stranger may be deriving 
sexual pleasure from a photograph of her abuse.34 
The devastating impact of sexual abuse on children is widely 
documented.35 In addition to the immediate physical injuries that 
occur because of the abuse, long-term effects include physical mani­
festations such as headaches, pelvic pain, and back pain, as well as 
psychological manifestations including increased fearfulness, feel­
ings of guilt and responsibility, a sense of powerlessness, and recur­
ring flashbacks and nightmares.36 Adolescents are often depressed 
and suicidal, and many wind up in criminal trouble.37 Adult survi­
vors have high rates of eating disorders, drug and alcohol addiction, 
sleep disturbances, and are more likely to engage in self-destructive 
behaviors like prostitution and self-mutilation.38 Males tend to re­
peat the abuse perpetrated on them with boys the same age as they 
were when they were abused.39 Females often become promiscu­
ous, are more likely to be in violent relationships, and tend to iso­
late themselves socially.40 
C. Child Pornography Online 
Before the Internet, child pornographers relied on film devel­
oped from cameras to produce images and the postal system to 
trade those images.41 Both of these methods of acquiring and ex­
changing pictures were expensive as well as sufficiently public to 
create a risk of discovery.42 In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice 
34. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.lO (1982); Kreston, supra note 30, at 
26; see also Perry v. Commonwealth, 780 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Mass. 2002) (writing that in­
ternet images are as permanent as conventional photographs). 
35. See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758; KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 10-11; LE­
VESQUE, supra note 22; WILLIAM E. PRENDERGAST, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS: A PREVENTIVE GUIDE FOR PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND COUNSELORS 
(1996); PAMELA D. SCHULTZ, NOT MONSTERS: ANALYZING THE STORIES OF CHILD 
MOLESTERS 11-16 (2005). 
36. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 10. 
37. Ruth S. Kempe, A Developmental Approach to the Treatment ofAbused Chil­
dren, in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note 10, at 543, 543-45. 
38. SCHULTZ, supra note 35, at 11-16. 
39. PRENDERGAST, supra note 35, at 71. 
40. Id. 
41. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Child Exploitation & Obscenity Section, Child Por­
nography Information Page, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/childporn.html (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2008). 
42. Id. 
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found that trafficking in child pornography in this country was al­
most nonexistent by the mid-1980s.43 
The Internet, on the other hand, has proven to be a child 
pornographer's ideal community.44 The Internet provides an inex­
pensive, anonymous arena for locating, disseminating, and repro­
ducing photographs and videos.45 The Department of Justice states 
that the simplicity of using the Internet "has resulted in an explo­
sion in the availability, accessibility, and volume of child pornogra­
phy."46 Evidencing this sentiment are statistics such as those 
presented by Robert Mueller, former Director of the Federal Bu­
reau of Investigation (FBI). Testifying before Congress in mid­
2007, he said that in 1996, his agency investigated only 113 cases 
involving online child pornography.47 In contrast, in the first six 
months of 2007, the FBI had investigated more than five thousand 
such cases.48 
Not surprisingly, child pornographers go to great lengths to 
maintain secrecy.49 The bulk of online activity occurs on secret 
newsgroups and bulletin boards that require passwords for viewing 
43. Id.; see also JENKINS, supra note 2, at 40 (detailing how investigations by the 
Postal Inspection Service have led to the arrest and conviction of thousands of 
offenders). 
44. In addition to enabling its users to maintain secrecy, the Internet has also 
proved to be a lucrative market for those who make a living off of creating child por­
nography. See Sternberg, supra note 22, at 2787 (relating the story of a child 
pornographer who claims, "[g]ive me a pretty, cooperative 14-, 15-year·old girl and I'll 
be sitting pretty with the money I make off her for a long time. Longer than you can 
imagine."); see also Henry F. Fradella, A Fourth Amendment Problem Combating In­
ternet Child Pornography, CRIM. L. BULL., Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 284, 284; KLAIN ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 55. 
45. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 41; see also Eichenwald, supra note 19, at Ai 
("Not long ago, adults sexually attracted to children were largely isolated from one 
another. But the Internet has created a virtual community where they can readily com­
municate and reinforce their feelings."). 
46. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 41. 
47. FBI-Oversight: Testimony Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Congo 
7 (2007) (statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
on July 26, 2007) [hereinafter FBI-Oversight], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
media/pdfs/Mueller070726.pdf; see also KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 46. 
48. FBI-Oversight, supra note 47, at 9; see also Collins, supra note 1. 
49. Kreston, supra note 30, at 26 ("For the same reason that drug dealers do not 
stand on street corners shouting out their wares for the general public to hear, child 
pornographers do not make their sites readily available to the general public for fear of 
being detected by the police."); see also JENKINS, supra note 2, at 52 ("[N]o structure 
... rivals the [online] child porn world for sheer complexity and creativity and for its 
global reach."); Lisa S. Smith, Private Possession of Child Pornography: Narrowing At­
Home Privacy Rights, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1011, 1011 (1991). 
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and trading photographs.50 To find the enormous cybercommunity, 
an individual must "consciously choos[e] a dozen times, or more, to 
click on icons and hyperlinks that assist and direct them in the ac­
tive search for child pornography."51 Yet, despite the complexity 
involved in locating the cybercommunity, enthusiasts find it. Al­
though the secrecy makes official statistics of the actual number of 
users unavailable,52 a member of a newsgroup, where much of the 
online activity occurs, estimated that approximately five to seven 
thousand new posts are added each week. 53 
This quantity of users also increases the quantity of available 
images. One researcher stated that in a month of visiting active 
child pornography sites, a user "could easily accumulate a child 
porn library of several thousand images."54 Writing about the child 
pornography cases that come through his courtroom, one judge 
stated that "a typical case involves possession of thousands of 
images of children. But the court has also seen cases involving a 
handful of photographs as well as cases involving 10,000 
photographs."55 
D. What Child Pornographers Do with the Pictures 
An estimated forty to sixty percent of defendants arrested for 
possession of child pornography were also found to have sexually 
abused children. 56 The link is not coincidental. Many child molest­
50. JENKINS, supra note 2, at 54, 56, 70. In fact, a search engine search for "child 
porn" will never bring up a site that features minors. Nor do any websites that include 
"child porn" or a similar phrase in their titles feature actual minors. These sites usually 
include photographs of adult men and women who look younger than they actually are. 
Id. at 53. 
51. Kreston, supra note 30, at 26 ("There are no accidental tourists. . .. Child 
pornography Web sites, though prolific, are not easily accessed by innocent 
individuals. "). 
52. JENKINS, supra note 2, at 13. 
53. Id. at 55. 
54. Id. at 3. "The material ... is astonishingly diverse, from hard-core child porn 
through naked images to winsome pictures of fully clothed children." Id. at 55. 
55. James E. Baker & Melanie Krebs-Pilotti, Internet Pandemic? The Not-So-Se­
cret and Expanding World of Child Pornography, 53 FED. LAW. 50, 52 (2006). 
56. See Kreston, supra note 30, at 30 (citing a study by the Crimes Against Chil­
dren Research Center at the University of New Hampshire, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children); see also Kim, 
supra note 16, at 18 (citing an internet crimes task force in Pennsylvania that found that 
over half of the defendants who were arrested for possession of child pornography were 
also sexually abusing children). Kim also cites a 2000 study by the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons that found that seventy-six percent of inmates who had been convicted of in­
ternet crimes against children also admitted that they had sexually molested children. 
The average number of victims per offender was 30.5. Id. 
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ers concede that child pornography "fuels their sexual fantasies and 
plays an important part in leading them to commit hands-on sexual 
offenses against children."57 
Photographs of children engaged in sexual activity serve to le­
gitimize the child pornographer's "belief systems,"58 enabling him 
to convince himself that the smiling child is consenting to the mo­
lestation, or that the child is, in fact, the seducer.59 Photographs, 
particularly given the vast quantity available online, have the fur­
ther impact of desensitizing the viewer.60 Initially, soft-core images 
of child pornography may be stimulating to a newcomer, but he will 
eventually move on to sites that feature material that is more 
lewd.61 As one bulletin-board poster wrote, "you want every day 
more and more and more."62 The link between viewing child por­
nography and sexual molestation is easy to understand in this con­
text. When viewing images is no longer stimulating, the viewer will 
seek out his own victim.63 
Those viewers who do seek out their own victims often use 
photographs to encourage children to participate.64 By showing 
children photographs of other children who look as if they are en­
joying the abuse, the child pornographers normalize the sexual ac­
tivity and create in the child a more willing participant.65 For 
example, 
[f]irst, the pedophile might allow the child to browse through a 
sexually-oriented magazine commonly found in the home. Once 
the child becomes comfortable with this material, the pedophile 
may expose the child to more explicit publications and films, 
which depict adults engaged in different sexual positions or ho­
mosexual activity. Finally, the pedophile will present the child 
57. Kim, supra note 16, at 18. 
58. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 6; LEVESQUE, supra note 22, at 64-65. 
59. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 6. 
60. JENKINS, supra note 2, at 109. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See LEVESQUE, supra note 22, at 64-65. 
64. /d. at 64. 
65. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 n.7 (1990) (citing Arr'y GEN.'S COMM'N 
ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT (1986»; see also KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 6; 
LEVESQUE, supra note 22, at 61; Kim, supra note 16, at 19 ("Grooming is a gradual 
process and a skilled child molester takes care in laying a foundation of trust, love and 
friendship before escalating the relationship to a sexual one." The photographs of 
other children "smiling, laughing and seemingly having fun" "diminish the child's inhi­
bitions and give the impression that sex between adults and children is normal, accept­
able and enjoyable."). 
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with depictions of children and adults engaging in sexual conduct. 
The child, having become desensitized to the material, can then 
be convinced to participate in sexual conduct and to be photo­
graphed or filmed. 
Possession of child pornography is therefore important to 
the perpetuation of child pornography.66 
One researcher explains that "pornography provides a powerful 
tool to help convince children that what they are being asked to do 
is 'all right."'67 
II. LEGISLATING AGAINST CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
A. 	 Setting the Stage to Criminalize Possession of Child 
Pornography 
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided its first child pornography 
case, New York v. Ferber.68 In that case, the Court upheld a New 
York law that criminalized the promotion of child pornography, 
finding that "[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of 
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing 
importance."69 
This ruling opened the door for federal legislative action 
against child pornography, beginning with the Child Protection Act 
of 1984,70 which followed the Supreme Court's Ferber decision by 
criminalizing the production, dissemination, and receipt of any sex­
ually exploitative depictions of children, regardless of whether they 
were obscene.71 Today, Congress's prohibitions of child pornogra­
66. Smith, supra note 49, at 1042 (citations omitted). 
67. LEVESQUE, supra note 22, at 64; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, 
§ 29C (West 2000) (including in the findings of the child pornography possession statute 
"that such material is used to break the will and resistance of other children so as to 
encourage them to participate in similar acts"). 
68. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); see MARY G. LEARY, Protecting 
Children from Child Pornography and the Internet: Where Are We Now?, CHILD SEX­
UAL EXPLOITATION UPDATE (Nat'l District Attorneys Ass'n, Alexandria, Va.), 2004, 
available at http://ndaa.orglpublications/newsletters/child_sexuaI3xploitation_update_ 
volume_1_numbec4_2004.html. 
69. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757; see also LEVESQUE, supra note 22, at 68 ("[T]he case 
reflects an important move to allow intrusion into any individual's private life in order 
to restrict immoral behavior."). See generally Susan G. Caughlan, Note, Private Posses­
sion of Child Pornography: The Tensions Between Stanley v. Georgia and New York v. 
Ferber, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 187 (1987) (providing a detailed analysis of the Ferber 
decision as it relates to obscenity). 
70. Child Protection Act of 1984, PUb. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204. 
71. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text; see also LEARY, supra note 68; 
Smith, supra note 49, at 1020-21. For a discussion of past laws proscribing the produc­
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phy are codified in the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 
which broadens the definition of criminal behavior beyond produc­
tion and disseminationJ2 For the purposes of this Note, the most 
important change to the Act since 1984 is its prohibition of the pos­
session of child pornography,73 which was added in 199074 after the 
Supreme Court decided Osborne v. Ohio.75 
B. Osborne v. Ohio 
The Supreme Court's decision in Osborne v. Ohio dictates the 
parameters within which a state can prohibit behavior connected to 
child pornographyJ6 In Osborne, the police found four photo­
graphs of a naked fourteen-year-old boy in a variety of sexual posi­
tions in Clyde Osborne's home.77 Osborne was convicted under an 
Ohio statute that criminalized the "possess[ion] or view[ing] of any 
material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person's 
child or ward in a state of nudity."78 Osborne challenged the stat­
tion, sale, and distribution of child pornography, see KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 12­
25. 
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000). Congress has amended the statute nearly a dozen 
times since 1984, most recently in the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools against the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act) and the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 12. 
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2256A(a) ("Any person who ... knowingly possesses any book, 
magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that con­
tains an image of child pornography ... shall be punished as provided in subsection 
(b). "). 
74. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14. 
75. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 107. 
78. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (West 2006). The statute states: 
(A) No person shall do any of the following: 
(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who 
is not the person's child or ward in a state of nudity, unless one of the follow­
ing applies: 
(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, 
possessed, controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or 
presented for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, 
governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychol­
ogist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide studies or re­
search, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a 
proper interest in the material or performance. 
(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has 
consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor in a state of 
nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or 
transferred. 
Id. 
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ute on constitutional grounds, claiming that he had a First Amend­
ment right to private possession of pornography.79 
The Court stated, "Given the gravity of the State's interests in 
this context, we find that Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the 
possession and viewing of child pornography."80 Prior to Osborne, 
possession of child pornography statutes reached only production, 
sale, or distribution of images.81 Although Osborne cleared the 
way to convict private viewers, the majority made no distinction 
between possession and viewing in its discussion of the constitution­
ality of the Ohio statute.82 Only in the dissent is there even a casual 
mention of the act of viewing as separate from the act of 
possessing.83 
C. Possession, Control, and Viewing 
Although states reacted to Osborne by amending their stat­
utes, many only added "knowing possession" to the list of criminal 
behaviors.84 Now, nearly twenty years after Osborne, every state 
has a criminal statute that prohibits behaviors involved with child 
79. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 107. See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 
(1969) (overruling a Georgia statute that banned the possession of obscene matter as 
perhaps "a noble purpose, but ... wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First 
Amendment"). 
80. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111. For a First Amendment analysis of the Court's 
holding, see Smith, supra note 49, at 1028, and Sternberg, supra note 22, at 2793-94. 
81. Fradella, supra note 44, at 6; see also LEVESQUE, supra note 22, at 69 (ex­
plaining that, in most countries, the regulation of child pornography only prohibits be­
haviors specifically associated with distribution and production). Because the Internet 
is borderless, photographs from foreign countries easily make their way into the United 
States. Id. at 66. 
82. Smith, supra note 49, at 1028-29 ("Justice White's opinion found that Ohio 
could reasonably conclude that proscribing the possession and viewing of child pornog­
raphy would decrease the demand for and production of these materials." (citing Os­
borne, 495 U.S. at 109-10)). 
83. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 138 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Since [the statute] 
makes it a crime to 'view' as well as to possess depictions of nudity, visitors to an art 
gallery might find themselves in violation of the law."). 
84. See Commonwealth v. Simone, No. 03-0986, 2003 WL 22994238, at *11 n.7 
(Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12,2003) (opining that after Osborne, "[t]he Virginia General Assem­
bly, perhaps not coincidentally, first criminalized the 'possession' of child pornography 
in 1992 with the enactment of Va. Code § 18.2-374.1:1, though production and distribu­
tion were already prohibited"); see also Thomas F. Liotti, Penal Law, 48 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 781, 786 (1998) ("In the area of child pornography, the Legislature continued to 
expand the punishment of child pornographers by creating the crimes of 'Possessing an 
Obscene Sexual Performance by a Child' and 'Possessing a Sexual Performance by a 
Child.' This is in response to Osborne v. Ohio." (citations omitted)); Fradella, supra 
note 44, at 6 ("In the wake of Osborne, both the federal government and those of the 
states criminalized possession of child pornography."). 
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pornography.85 Yet, only three states-Ohio, New Jersey, and Ar­
kansas-criminalize the viewing of child pornography.86 
Comprehension of the definitions of viewing, possession, and 
control is necessary to understand how prosecutors and courts are 
interpreting the statutes of their jurisdictions in relation to images a 
defendant accesses online. First, to view is "to look at attentively: 
scrutinize, observe. "87 In general, neither control nor possession is 
required for the act of viewing to occur. 
Second, a common articulation of what constitutes criminal 
possession can be found in the Model Penal Code, which requires 
that "the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing pos­
sessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to 
have been able to terminate his possession."88 Knowing possession 
requires a further showing that the defendant was aware that the 
images he possessed were, in fact, child pornography.89 Courts 
have found that a defendant who has downloaded, printed, emailed, 
or saved an online image of child pornography has demonstrated 
his knowing possession of the image.9o 
A further articulation of criminal possession from the Model 
Jury Instructions for the Massachusetts Superior Court makes clear 
that a defendant need not exercise control over an object to have 
possessed it. He need only have the ability to do so: "The word 
possession means that a person has knowledge of the location of 
the object, and the ability and the intention to exercise control and 
power over it."91 
Finally, a handful of states criminalize the knowing possession 
and control of child pornography.92 Courts in these jurisdictions 
85. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 26. 
86. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-27-304(a)(2) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24­
4(5)(b) (West 2005); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (West 2006). 
87. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S, supra note 15, at 1394. 
88. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (Official Draft 1962). The dictionary defini­
tion of possession is "the act of having or taking into control." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S, 
supra note 15, at 968. The legal definition is "to have in one's actual control." BLACK'S 
LAW DICf10NARY 546 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S]. 
89. The Model Penal Code states that a defendant has knowledge when "he is 
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist." MODEL PE­
NAL CODE, supra note 88, § 2.02(2)(b)(I). 
90. United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005) (Kelly, J., 
dissenting). 
91. 1 MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUC­
TIONS § 2,49.1 (2003) [hereinafter MASS. JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. 
92. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-403(3)(b.5) (West 2004); supra note 7 
(pertinent provision of Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated section 18-6-403(3)(b.5». 
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look to whether the defendant "exercise[ d] power or influence 
over" the images.93 When a prosecutor charges a defendant who 
looked at child pornography online with controlling the images, the 
court does not need to address whether the defendant actually pos­
sessed the images.94 If the evidence demonstrates that the defen­
dant took the steps to seek out the images, the court can convict 
him of controlling those images.95 Consequently, in jurisdictions 
where prosecutors can charge defendants with control rather than 
with possession, the issue of whether viewing is equivalent to pos­
session does not arise. Prosecutors need only prove that the defen­
dant controlled the images-proof of possession of them is 
unnecessary. 
D. 	 The Browser Cache and the Relationship Between Possession 
and Viewing 
The need to distinguish between viewing and possession has 
arisen in cases in which a defendant admits to viewing images on­
line but argues that his conduct did not rise to the level of posses­
sion because the images exist only in cyberspace and not in a 
tangible form in his control.96 In these cases, the prosecution uses 
the existence of images in the defendant's computer's browser 
cache to demonstrate that by viewing the images, he came into pos­
session of them.97 
93. BLACK'S, supra note 88, at 146. 
94. See Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 175 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(clarifying that because the court had found the appellant guilty of control of porno­
graphic images, "we need not reach the issue of whether his actions of accessing and 
viewing the images constituted possession thereof"), appeal granted, 939 A.2d 290 (Pa. 
2007); see also Barton v. State, 648 S.E.2d 660 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, No. 
S07C1655, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 622 (Ga. Sept. 10,2007). In Barton, the court noted that, 
although Georgia prohibits both possession and control of child pornography, the pros­
ecution failed to include "control" in its indictment. Id. at 661 n.2. The court 
"[r]eluctantly" agreed with Barton that the prosecution had not provided sufficient evi­
dence to convict him of possession of the 106 images found in his computer cache, and 
the court did not have the option to convict him of control of the images. Id. at 662. 
95. See Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172. In Diodoro, the Pennsylvania court found that 
the defendant's use of the computer mouse, his search for websites, and his closing of 
those websites were indicative of his intent and his ability to control the 300 images 
found in his computer cache. Id. at 174. Moreover, the court reasoned, "while Appel­
lant was viewing the pornography, he had the ability to download the images, print 
them, copy them, or email them to others, which we find is further evidence of control." 
Id. at 174-75. 
96. See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993-96 (9th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 
1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002). 
97. Romm, 455 F.3d at 993-96; Bass, 411 F.3d at 1200; Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1204. 
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A browser cache is a folder located on the hard drive of every 
computer into which the web browser automatically saves a copy of 
every viewed web page.98 The process speeds up the loading of in­
ternet pages because, when a user returns to a website, the web 
browser retrieves the page from the cache rather than the In­
ternet.99 The storage process is a default function on the com­
puter.1°o Even files that are manually deleted or put into the 
recycle bin remain saved in the cache.1°1 Although when the cache 
fills up, the oldest files in it are replaced by the newest ones viewed 
by the user, 102 one court referred to the everlasting effect of looking 
at an image online as a "digital footprint."103 
Users who are aware of the existence of the cache can delete it 
manually or withcommercial software.104 However, without foren­
sic software-and, of course, without knowledge of the cache's exis­
tence-a user cannot access the images stored in the cache. lOS In 
possession cases that rely on the existence of images in the defen­
dant's cache, the dispositive issue is the defendant's awareness of 
how his computer works and whether he understood that the 
images he viewed saved to his computer.1°6 
98. Ty E. Howard, Don't Cache Out Your Case: Prosecuting Child Pornography 
Possession Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary Internet Files, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1227, 1229-30 (2004). 
99. Id. at 1230. 
100. Bass, 411 F.3d at 1207 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
101. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); see 
also Beryl A. Howell, Real World Problems o/Virtual Crime, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 
116 (2004) ("Images searched out, found and viewed on web pages are automatically 
saved by the computer's web browser in a browser cache file and stored on the hard 
drive, until the contents of that file are deleted by the user."). 
102. PETER KENT, THE COMPLETE IDIOT's GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 83 (6th ed. 
1999). 
103. Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1071. 
104. JENKINS, supra note 2, at 110-11 (explaining that experienced child 
pornographers will often "instruct novices in the essential importance of cleaning the 
computer's cache regularly to erase images, which might otherwise constitute legal evi­
dence of possession of child pornography"); see also KENT, supra note 102, at 286 (in­
structing, in a section entitled "I was 'Researching' at Hustler Online, and now I'm 
unemployed," that "[t]o cover your tracks, clear the cache to remove the offending 
pages"); Howard, supra note 98, at 1231. 
105. United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2006) ("When the 
Active Temporary Internet Files get too full, they spill excess saved information into the 
Deleted Temporary Internet Files. All of this goes on without any action (or even 
knowledge) of the computer user."); see also Barton v. State, 648 S.E.2d 660,661 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1655, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 622 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2007). 
106. See, e.g., United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002). 
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III. PROSECUTING THE VIEWING DEFENDANT 

UNDER THE FEDERAL STATUTE 

A. The Federal Statute 
Federal statute 18 U.S.c. § 2252A criminalizes the knowing 
possession of child pornography.107 All federal courts have agreed 
that a defendant who admitted to viewing child pornography online 
cannot be guilty of possession if he was unaware that the images he 
was viewing were saved to the cache on his hard drive.108 The 
courts' legal wrangling occurs primarily around the difficulty of ap­
plying the legal definition of possession to intangible images that 
exist only in cyberspace.109 
B. The Necessity of Knowledge 
In United States v. Stulock,no the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit clarified that knowledge of the existence of the cache 
is critical to a finding of guilt under knowing possession. The court 
stated, "[o]ne cannot be guilty of possession for simply having 
viewed an image on a Web site, thereby causing the image to be 
automatically stored in the browser's cache, without having pur­
posely saved or downloaded the image."111 
In United States v. Kuchinski,n2 the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit drew a bright line between knowing possession and 
possession. Kuchinski had downloaded 110 images, but his cache 
contained nearly 18,000 additional images. In deciding what quan­
tity of images should be used in determining his sentence, the court 
stated: 
There is no question that the child pornography images were 
found on the computer's hard drive and that Kuchinski possessed 
the computer itself. Also, there is no doubt that he had accessed 
the web page that had those images somewhere upon it, whether 
he actually saw the images or not. What is in question is whether 
it makes a difference that, as far as this record shows, Kuchinski 
had no knowledge of the images that were simply in the cache 
files. It does.113 
107. 18 U.S.c. § 2252A (2000). See supra note 6 for the text of the statute. 
108. See, e.g., Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 862; Stulock, 308 F.3d at 925. 
109. Howard, supra note 98, at 1253. 
110. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922. 
111. Id. at 925. 
112. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 861. 
113. Id. at 862. 
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Kuchinski's inability to control the images in his cache was the dis­
positive point. Unable to exercise "dominion and control" over the 
images, he could not have knowingly possessed them.l 14 
C. Using Control to Demonstrate Possession 
All federal courts have found the defendant's knowledge of the 
cache necessary for a conviction of knowing possession.l15 The ma­
jority of courts have found that his ability to control the images 
while he was looking at them to be sufficient to meet the definition 
of possession.116 
In United States v. Tucker,117 the defendant argued that he had 
not possessed child pornography but had only viewed it on his web 
browser.118 He claimed that, although he understood that his com­
puter saved images to the cache file on his hard drive, he deleted 
them after each viewing because he did not want the images 
saved.119 The court looked to the "ordinary, everyday meaning" of 
possession and found Tucker guilty because, regardless of his at­
tempt to delete the images, he understood that his computer was 
saving them.120 That understanding enabled him to control the 
images, which the court found sufficient to establish that he pos­
sessed them.121 The court's conviction rested on Tucker's express 
awareness of the computer cache.122 
Three years later, in United States v. Bass, the same court 
found Bass guilty based on his inferred awareness that images were 
114. Id. at 863. 
Where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly 
lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with 
possession and control of the child pornography images located in those files, 
without some other indication of dominion and control over the images. To 
do so turns abysmal ignorance into knowledge and a less than valetudinarian 
grasp into dominion and control. 
Id. 
115. See, e.g., id. at 861; United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005); Stulock, 308 F.3d at 925. 
116. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
117. United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002). 
118. Id. at 1204. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. ("We agree with the district court ... that Tucker had control over the 
files present in his Web browser cache files."); see also Kreston, supra note 30, at 27. 
122. Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1204 ("Tucker maintains that he did not possess child 
pornography but merely viewed it on his Web browser. He concedes, however, that he 
knew that when he visited a Web page, the images ... would be sent to his browser 
cache file and thus saved on his hard drive."). 
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saved onto his hard drive.123 In Bass, the defendant admitted that 
he had viewed child pornography but claimed that he was unaware 
that the images automatically saved to his cache.124 In fact, he had 
run a program to delete any images from his computer specifically 
because he did not want to possess them (and did not want his 
mother to see them).125 Relying on its decision in Tucker, the court 
held that Bass's attempt to delete the images was evidence of his 
awareness that the computer had automatically saved them. Be­
cause "a jury ... reasonably could have inferred" that he knew the 
images were saved, the court found that the case was similar to 
Tucker.126 
Dissenting, Judge Kelly charged the majority with rewriting the 
statute to criminalize viewing.127 "Although reprehensible," he 
wrote, "viewing child pornography is not a crime." He found that 
the real issue of proving knowing possession beyond a reasonable 
doubt rested on the distinction between Bass's suspicion that the 
images he viewed were saved onto his hard drive and his lack of 
affirmative knowledge that they had been saved.128 He argued that 
"[k]nowing possession of pornography cannot be established 
merely by demonstrating that Mr. Bass was ignorant, negligent, 
careless, or foolish not to have known that downloading files is 
easy, and material is saved in temporary internet files."129 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit looked to the Tenth 
Circuit for guidance in deciding United States v. Romm.l30 Stuart 
Romm looked at child pornography websites while in a hotel room 
in Las Vegas. More than forty images had saved to his computer 
cache.131 The court found that Romm's act of enlarging several of 
the photographs from their original thumbnail size demonstrated 
his ability to control the images, which was sufficient to establish 
knowing possession at the time at which he was viewing the 
images.132 The court went on to differentiate the act of viewing 
from the act of possession as manifested by the ability, whether ac­
ted on or not, to control the images on the screen. Writing about a 
123. United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). 
124. Id. at 1202. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1206 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 1207. 
129. Id. 
130. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2006). 
131. Id. at 995. 
132. Id. at 1001. 
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dissenting opinion in United States v. Gourde,133 the Romm court 
stated: 
Assuming a lack of control over the images saved to the cache, 
our colleague has opined that a person who looks at child por­
nography over the internet no more 'receives' it, than a visitor to 
the Louvre 'receives' a visualization of the Mona Lisa. However, 
as the record here indicates, Romm had access to, and control 
over, the images that were displayed on his screen and saved to 
his cache. He could copy the images, print them or email them to 
others, and did, in fact, enlarge several of the images. This con­
trol clearly differentiates Romm's conduct from that of a visitor 
to the Louvre who gazes on the Mona Lisa, even if we put aside 
the stringent museum rules against photographing or copying 
without museum permission.134 
Again, the dispositive issue in Romm was the defendant's ability to 
control the images as he viewed them. He could have printed, 
emailed, or copied them.135 The common thread in the federal 
courts' decisions is that a defendant's awareness of the browser 
cache is sufficient to find that he had the ability to control the 
images he viewed and, consequently, to convict him of possession. 
IV. PROSECUTING IN STATE COURTS 
State courts with possession-only statutes often convict child 
pornography viewers under the doctrine of constructive posses­
133. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
Gourde contested whether the investigators had probable cause to search his computer 
for images of child pornography. The majority found that "[i]t neither strains logic nor 
defies common sense to conclude, based on the totality of these circumstances, that 
someone who paid for access for two months to a website that actually purveyed child 
pornography probably had viewed or downloaded such images onto his computer." Id. 
at 1071. However, in his dissent, Judge Kleinfeld argued that the federal statute does 
not prohibit viewing child pornography. 
About the closest the statutes get to mere looking is the phrase "knowingly 
receives." Though precedent does not settle the question, it does not square 
with common sense to treat looking as knowingly receiving. . .. One would 
not say that a person who had looked at the Mona Lisa at the Louvre had 
"received" it. ... The government tries to make something of the computer 
browser's cache, but that cannot be the same thing as "receiving" because the 
cache is an area of memory and disk space available to the browser software, 
not to the computer user .... The concept of "receiving" implies possession. 
Possession requires dominion and control, a concept well understood from 
drug and firearms cases. 
Id. at 1081-82. 
134. Romm, 455 F03d at 1001 (citations omitted). 
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sion.136 Constructive possession is "control or dominion over a 
property without actual possession or custody of it. "137 Although 
each state has its own definition of what constitutes constructive 
possession,138 the commonality among these cases is the courts' fo­
cus on the ability of the defendant to control the images. 
A. Application of the Doctrine of Constructive Possession 
In Kromer v. Commonwealth,139 the Virginia Appeals Court 
defined possession in the context of the Internet for the first time. 
Looking to the precedent of Tucker,140 the court concluded that 
whoever had used the computer in question had knowingly pos­
sessed child pornography.141 Having established that child pornog­
raphy existed on the computer and that the defendant was aware of 
the existence of the pornography, the court then looked to link the 
defendant to the computer to establish his constructive possession 
of the pornography.142 The defendant did not raise the issue of his 
ignorance of the computer cache until his appeal, so the court did 
not consider whether he could be found to have constructively pos­
sessed the images in his cache of which he was unaware.143 Rather, 
this case suggests that, once downloaded from the Internet, images 
136. See, e.g., Ward v. State, No. CR-05-1277, 2007 WL 1228169 (Ala. Crim. App. 
Apr. 27, 2007) (per curiam); Kromer v. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d 871 (Va. Ct. App. 
2005); State v. Mobley, 118 P.3d 413 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
137. BLACK'S, supra note 88, at 547. Acclaimed property law scholar, Jesse 
Dukeminier, described the use of the term "constructive" as "a way of pretending that 
whatever word it modifies depicts a state of affairs that actually exists when actually it 
does not." He continued: "The pretense is made whenever judges wish, usually for 
good but often undisclosed reasons, a slightly different reality than the one confronting 
them." JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 29 n.14 (6th ed. 2006). 
138. See MASS. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 91 (explaining that constructive 
possession exists when a "person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has 
both the power and the intention at any given time to exercise dominion, power or 
control over an object either directly or through another person"). 
139. Kromer, 613 S.E.2d at 871. 
140. United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002); see supra notes 117­
122 and accompanying text. 
141. Kromer, 613 S.E.2d at 874. In Kromer, the defendant was charged with vio­
lating section 18.2-374.1:1(A) of the Code of Virginia which states, "Any person who 
knowingly possesses child pornography is guilty of a Class 6 felony." Id. at 872. 
142. Id. at 874. The court stated that, "[w]hile this appears to be a case consigned 
to the new and evolving area of computer technology, we examine this case under fa­
miliar principles of constructive possession of contraband." Id. The constructive pos­
session standard, taken from a drug case, required, "circumstances which tend to show 
that the defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the substance and 
that it was subject to his dominion and control." Id. 
143. Id. at 875. 
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on a computer can be found to be constructively possessed by the 
owner of the computer. 
Similarly, the Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals looked to a 
drug possession case for a definition of constructive possession in 
Ward v. State,144 holding that "[ c ]onstructive possession exists when 
the defendant exercises, or has the power to exercise, dominion and 
control over the item."145 The court found that Ward had the 
power to control the images of child pornography when he was 
viewing the web pages.146 Although the evidence was insufficient 
to show whether Ward had actually exercised that power, the fact 
that he could have done so was sufficient to show that he had know­
ing possession of the images.147 
Whereas the courts in Kuchinski148 and Stuiock I49 found the 
defendants incapable of knowing possession when they were una­
ware of the existence of the images in their caches, the Washington 
Court of Appeals found the defendant guilty of constructive posses­
sion, despite his ignorance of the cache.150 In State v. iV/obley, the 
defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography for 
three images found in his cache.151 Here, the court focused on the 
issues of dominion and control rather than on the technological 
savvy of the defendant.152 Mobley claimed that, although he had 
dominion and control over the hard drives on which the images 
were found, he had no more than "passing control" over the images 
144. Ward v. State, No. CR-05-1277, 2007 WL 1228169, at *7 (Ala. Crim. App. 
Apr. 27, 2007) (per curiam). Ward was charged with violating section 13A-12-192(b) of 
the Code of Alabama. Id. at *1; see ALA. CODE § 13A-12-192(b) (LexisNexis 2007); see 
also supra note 6. 
145. Ward, 2007 WL 1228169, at *7 (quoting United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 
1067, 1077 (4th Cir. 1980) in which nine passengers on a boat were found guilty of 
constructive possession of two tons of marijuana). 
146. Id. at *8. 
147. Id. 
148. United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006). 
149. United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2002). 
150. State v. Mobley, 118 P.3d 413, 417 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). Mobley was con­
victed of violating section 9.68A.070 of the Revised Code of Washington, which states, 
"A person who knowingly possesses visual or printed matter depicting a minor engaged 
in sexually explicit conduct is guilty of a class C felony." Id. 
151. Id. at 414. 
152. Id. at 416 (surmising "that the core question seems to be whether the totality 
of the circumstances establishes that a defendant reached out for and exercised domin­
ion and control over the images at issue"). Although the court does not expressly in­
clude the other crime from which the defendant was convicted within its discussion of 
the totality of the circumstances, it seems possible that it included in its deliberations 
the charge that he had raped his ten-year-old daughter, which she testified he did every 
week for two years. Id. at 414. 
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while he was viewing them.153 The court, however, examined the 
legislative intent behind the statute and determined that it was best 
met by considering the relationship between the defendant and the 
images.154 
The court looked to a drug-possession case for the jurisdic­
tion's standard for constructive possession and found that it re­
quired that the defendant have dominion and control over the 
contraband or the premises where the contraband is found. 155 The 
court then concluded that the evidence that Mobley had sought out 
child pornography sites and had viewed images of child pornogra­
phy was sufficient for a finding that he had controlled those 
images.156 Accordingly, he was held to be guilty of constructive 
possession.157 
B. A Dissenting Judge on Viewing 
Pennsylvania prohibits possession or control of child pornogra­
phy.158 In Commonwealth v. Diodoro, Anthony Diodoro admitted 
that he had sought out child pornography websites and had viewed 
images online.159 Using a familiar argument,160 he claimed that be­
cause he had neither saved nor downloaded the images, he had not 
possessed them.16I The Pennsylvania court focused its discussion 
on whether Diodoro had controlled the thirty images found in his 
computer cache.162 Because the court found the evidence to be suf­
153. Id. at 416. 
154. Id. ("This approach recognizes and promotes the purposes behind Washing­
ton's child pornography statute, to protect children by discouraging their sexual ex­
ploitation for commercial gain and personal satisfaction."). 
155. Id. (citing State v. Morgan, 896 P.2d 731, 733 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), which 
found a defendant who was near the hood of a car that had cocaine on it guilty of 
possession). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 6312(d) (West 2007) ("Any person who know­
ingly possesses or controls any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, 
videotape, computer depiction or other material depicting a child under the age of 18 
years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act commits an 
offense. "). 
159. Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), appeal 
granted, 939 A.2d 290 (Pa. 2007). 
160. See United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002). 
161. Diodoro, 932 A.2d at 174. 
162. Id. 
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ficient to support the charge of control, it did not extend its discus­
sion into whether Diodoro had possessed the images.163 
Like dissenting Judge Kelly in United States v. Bass,l64 dissent­
ing Judge Klein charged the Diodoro majority with rewriting the 
statute.165 Further, he took issue with how the majority interpreted 
the statute, which, like similar statutes around the country, he 
found ambiguous. He asked, "[i]f appellate courts from other juris­
dictions struggle with the issue, how can this Court reasonably say 
that the language in our statute is clear enough to provide a layper­
son with fair warning that the mere viewing of child pornography 
on a computer screen is a crime?"166 
Judge Klein noted that the majority's holding was in line with 
the legislative intent behind the statute to "cut off the market for 
child pornographers by criminalizing the purchasers. "167 And while 
he never made a specific plea to the legislature to rewrite the stat­
ute to include viewing, he did suggest-three times-that if viewing 
were prohibited, there would be no question as to Diodoro's 
guilt.168 
A 2007 New Jersey case supports Judge Klein's claim that a 
prohibition on viewing could have resulted in the just conviction of 
Diodoro.169 In State v. Tanner, the defendant appealed his convic­
tion of possession of child pornography, claiming that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that he possessed the images on his 
hard drive pO The court pointed out that even without sufficient 
163. Id. at 175 n.5 (clarifying that because the court had found the appellant 
guilty of control of pornographic images, "we need not reach the issue of whether his 
actions of accessing and viewing the images constituted possession thereof"). Given the 
strong dissent over the majority's holding, it seems likely that the majority would have 
raised the issue of possession if it believed it was a viable claim. 
164. Bass, 411 F.3d at 1206 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
165. Diadara, 932 A.2d at 176 (Klein, J., dissenting). 
166. /d. at 179. 
167. Id. at 176. 
168. Id. ("Were the legislature to amend the statute to prohibit individuals from 
'knowingly possessing, controlling, or viewing' child pornography, there would be no 
issue. But that is not what the legislature has done, at least not yet."); id. at 179 
("Again, the legislature could have drafted [the statute] to criminalize the mere viewing 
of child pornography. In our sister state of New Jersey, for example, the statute does 
not merely prohibit the possession of child pornography."); id. ("While it well may be 
desirable for the Pennsylvania legislature to amend the statute to specifically proscribe 
the 'viewing' of child pornography, as the New Jersey legislature did, it has not done 
so."). 
169. See State v. Tanner, No. 03-06-128-S, 2007 WL 2239184 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Aug. 6, 2007) (per curiam) (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (West 
2005)). 
170. Id. at *3, 
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evidence to convict him of possession, "the statute proscribes either 
the viewing of that pornography, or the possession, and the jury did 
not necessarily need to find both to sustain a conviction."l71 The 
appeals court affirmed the trial court's conviction based on the de­
fendant's viewing of child pornography.172 
V. THE MASSACHUSETTS STATUTE 
A. 	 The Origin of the Massachusetts Prohibition Against 
Possession of Child Pornography 
1. The Social Context 
On October 1, 1997, Jeffrey Curley, a ten-year-old boy from 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, was kidnapped, raped, suffocated to 
death with a gasoline-soaked cloth, and thrown into a river in 
Maine.173 Child pornography was found in the apartment of one of 
the two men charged with his murder, and materials from the North 
American Man/Boy Love Association were in his car.174 Two 
months later, the acting Governor of Massachusetts, Paul Cellucci, 
signed into law section 29C of chapter 272 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws,ns outlawing the knowing purchase and possession 
of child pornography in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.176 
Although none of the legislative history of section 29C men­
tions Curley's death, the Massachusetts legislature could not have 
been unaware of the petition that was delivered to the State House 
by the Curley family at a rally on October 19, 1997.177 Signed by 
6800 voters, the petition demanded harsher penalties for crimes in­
171. 	 Id. 
172. 	 Id. at *4. 
173. Brian MacQuarrie, Father of Slain Boy Wrestles with Grief, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 17, 1997, Metro Section, at AI. 
174. Id. The reporter describes the North American ManlBoy Love Association 
(NAMBLA) as "a group that advocates consensual sex between men and boys." Id. In 
2000, in a case that is still pending, the Curley family sued NAMBLA for wrongful 
death, claiming that the information provided on its website incited their son's murder­
ers to commit the killing and rape. Judy Rakowsky, Curley Parents Sue Man-Boy 
'Love' Group, Web Site Say [sic] Killer Was Spurred by Joining NAMBLA, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May 17, 2000, at Bl. 
175. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29C (2006). For the full text of the statute, see 
supra note 12. 
176. Act of Nov. 26,1997, ch. 181,1997 Mass. Acts 1034 (codified at MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 272, § 29C). 
177. Joe Ryan, 15,000 Sign Death Penalty, Child Porn Petitions, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 19, 1997, Metro Section, at B4. 
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volving child pornography.118 At the time the petition was signed, 
only the production179 and dissemination180 of child pornography 
were prohibited in Massachusetts. However, it is unlikely that vot­
ers knew at that time that Representative Nancy Flavin had already 
introduced a bill outlawing possession of child pornography in Jan­
uary of 1997181 in response to what was widely viewed as an outra­
geous outcome of a correct interpretation of the law.182 A 
Hampshire County trial court judge had found a defendant guilty of 
child molestation and then found no law upon which she could re­
fuse his request for the return of the child pornography that the 
police had confiscated from his home.183 
2. The Bill and Its Passage 
Thus, when Jeffrey Curley was murdered, the bill prohibiting 
the purchase and possession of child pornography was already mak­
ing its way through the House and the Senate.184 However, 
Curley's death and the resulting petition seemed to speed up the 
process of the bill's passage. Less than two weeks after the petition 
arrived at the State House, having sat with the Senate since mid­
July, the bill was read a third time on the Senate flOOr. 185 At that 
time, a new section that declared the statute an "emergency law"186 
and included legislative findings was added. 
178. Id. This petition was accompanied by another, signed by 8600 voters, de­
manding a reinstatement of the death penalty. Id. See generally Doris Sue Wong & 
Adrian Walker, House Says 'Yes' to Death Penalty, Vote is 81-79; Bill Differs from Sen­
ate's, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 1997, Metro Section, at AI. Massachusetts had not exe­
cuted a criminal since 1947 and had no statute permitting capital punishment at the time 
of Jeffrey Curley's death. [d. Although the Senate had voted three times in the years 
since 1982 to reinstate the death penalty, the House rejected each bill. Id. Twenty­
seven days after Curley's death, the House voted to reinstate the death penalty. Id. In 
the final vote of the entire legislature, the measure lost by one vote. Matt Murphy, 
House Lawmakers Again Soundly Reject Mass. Death-Penalty Bill, LOWELL SUN 
(Mass.), Nov. 8, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 22053860 (Westlaw). 
179. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (2006) (statute entitled "Child Pornogra­
phy or the Enticement, Solicitation, Employment, etc. of Children"). 
180. /d. at § 29B (statute entitled "Dissemination of, and Possession with Intent 
to Disseminate, Obscene Matter"). 
181. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, ch. 181. 
182. See Doris Sue Wong, Tougher Child Porn Law Applauded, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 9, 1997, Metro Section, at B8. 
183. Id. 
184. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, ch. 181. 
185. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, S. House, No. 4246-181, at 1067-68 (Mass. Oct. 30, 
1997) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE SENATE). 
186. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, referendum, pt. 2 requires that any law de­
clared to be an emergency law must include a preamble "setting forth the facts consti­
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Whereas, The deferred operation of this act would tend to 
defeat its purpose, which is to punish the possession of child por­
nography, therefore it is hereby declared to be an emergency law, 
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public 
convenience. 
SECTION 1. The General Court hereby finds: (1) that the 
sexual exploitation of children constitutes a wrongful invasion of 
a child's right to privacy and results in social, developmental and 
emotional injury to such child and that to protect children from 
sexual exploitation it is necessary to prohibit the production of 
material which involves or is derived from such exploitation and 
to exclude all such material from the channels of trade and com­
merce; (2) that the mere possession or control of any sexually 
exploitative material results in continuing victimization of chil­
dren as such material is a permanent record of an act or acts of 
sexual abuse or exploitation of a child and that each time such 
material is viewed the child is harmed; (3) that such material is 
used to break the will and resistance of other children so as to 
encourage them to participate in similar acts; (4) that laws ban­
ning the production and distribution of such material are insuffi­
cient to halt this abuse and exploitation; (5) that to stop the 
sexual abuse and exploitation of children, it is necessary to ban 
the possession of any sexually exploitative materials; and (6) that 
the commonwealth has a compelling interest in outlawing the 
possession of any materials which sexually exploit children in or­
der to protect the privacy, health and emotional welfare of chil­
dren and society as a whole.187 
On November 17, 1997, the House unanimously adopted the 
bill, including the new preamble and the emergency measure.188 
Two weeks later, the bill became law.189 As he presented the new 
law to the public, acting Governor Cellucci stated: "'It is now ille­
gal to purchase or have in your home or in your possession 
magazines, books, videos, Polaroid shots, or to download from the 
Internet material that contain[ s] sexually exploitative images of 
tuting the emergency, and shall contain the statement that such law is necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, safety or convenience." Emergency 
statutes take effect immediately. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 1 (2006). 
187. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 185, at 1067 (emphasis added). 
188. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, H.R. House, No. 4246-181, at 1154-55 (Mass. Nov. 
17,1997). 
189. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, ch. 181,1997 Mass. Acts 1034 (codified at MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 272, § 29C (2006)). 
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children. . .. There will be zero tolerance of those who dare dabble 
in this filth. "'190 
At the time the Massachusetts legislature created section 29C, 
the three other states that currently prohibited viewing of child por­
nography-Arkansas,191 Ohio,192 and New Jerseyl93-had already 
enacted their statutes.l94 The Massachusetts legislative history does 
not include any of the debates or discussions regarding the selection 
of behaviors to be prohibited by the statute. Although the pream­
ble refers specifically to possession, control, and viewing195 as those 
activities that victimize children,196 the law only prohibits knowing 
purchase and possession.197 
B. Statutory Interpretation in Massachusetts 
1. Statutory Interpretation Generally 
Just as judges nationwide have applied the federal and state 
statutes prohibiting possession of child pornography to viewers of 
190. Wong, supra note 182. 
191. S.B. 432, 78th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1991). The Bill included a 
statement: 
It is the express intent of this act to eradicate the use of children as subjects of 
pornographic materials. This act seeks to protect victims of child pornography 
and to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children. The use of chil­
dren as subjects of pornographic material is harmful to the physical and psy­
chological health of children. Thus, this state has a compelling interest in 
penalizing those who solicit, receive, purchase, exchange, possess, view, dis­
tribute or control such material. 
Id. 
192. Act of Dec. 15, 1988, 1988 Ohio Legis. Servo Ann. 281 (West) (codified at 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (West 2006), which prohibits the possession or con­
trol of child pornography, and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323, which prohibits the 
possession or viewing of child pornography). 
193. Act of Apr. 2, 1992, ch. 2, 1992 N.J. Sess. Law Servo ch. 2 (West) (codified at 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4(5)(b) (West 2005)). The child pornography statute was 
amended to prohibit possession and viewing of child pornography. N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:24-4(5)(b). 
194. Colorado's child pornography statute also includes an express finding that 
"each time such material is shown or viewed, the child is harmed." COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18-6-403(1.5) (West 2004). In People V. Renander, the court agreed with the 
prosecution that this finding authorized a charge per image rather than the total num­
ber of children viewed. People V. Renander, 151 P.3d 657, 660 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). 
The court further found that the statute was "designed to stop the sexual victimization 
of children," and that "each sexually exploitative image is a permanent record and, 
therefore, constitutes a discrete act of victimization of the child." Id. at 662. 
195. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 185, at 1067-68. The preamble does 
not appear in the codified statute. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29C (2006). 
196. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C (West 2000). 
197. Id. 
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online pornography,198 inevitably Massachusetts judges will soon 
have to do the same. To apply statutory law to cases before them, 
judges must interpret the statute under which a defendant has been 
charged. Interpretation includes a determination of the plain 
meaning of the words199 and the intent of the legislative body in 
writing those words.2°O Usually, such interpretation is simple.201 If 
the statute's words are unambiguous, then the intent of the legisla­
ture in writing those words is clear, and the application of the words 
should achieve their intended effect. In such situations, the desired 
result of clear law-that "[c]itizens ought to be able to open up the 
statute books and have a good idea of their rights and obliga­
tions"202-is fulfilled. 
However, when a statute's words do not give rise to the appar­
ent intent of the legislative body, or when the words are ambiguous 
and the meaning not easily decipherable,203 courts must engage in 
198. See, e.g., United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bass, 411 
F.3d 1198, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 
2002). 
199. Gurley v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 477, 479-80 (Mass. 1973) ("Where the 
language of a statute is plain, it must be interpreted in accordance with the usual and 
natural meaning of the words."); see also Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 72 (Mass. 
2005) ("There are ... occasions when we depart from the literal wording of a statute, 
despite the unambiguous nature of that literal wording. However, such departures from 
the Legislature's straightforward wording are rare, reserved for those instances where 
application of the literal meaning would result in 'absurd or unreasonable' conse­
quences ...."); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 678 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1997) ("We look first to the words of the statute ...."); 2A NORMAN J. 
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:01, at 113-29 (6th ed. 2000) 
(explaining the plain meaning rule); JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STAT­
UTES 51-52 (1982). 
200. See HURST, supra note 199, at 32 ("The standard criterion for proper inter­
pretation of a statute is to find 'the intention of the legislature. "'). 
201. In most statutes, the words achieve the intent without any need for interpre­
tation. Noted legal scholar William Eskridge writes: 
At the time of its enactment, a statute usually resolves the most pressing 
legal questions that gave rise to it, and resolves them in ways that are just as 
clear to the addressees as to the authors of the statute. For such issues there is 
no need for "interpretation"; the statute is clear. Interpretation is required for 
those issues that were ... unanticipated .... 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9 (1994); see also 
STEVEN VAGO, LAW AND SOCIETY 184 (6th ed. 2000) (writing that courts generally are 
easily able to apply statutes to the cases before them). 
202. ESKRIDGE, supra note 201, at 33. 
203. Ambiguity exists in statutes for a variety of reasons, including, for example, 
sloppy drafting, the legislature's failure to predict possible future scenarios, and the 
necessity of a bill's proponents to make adjustments in order to get the statute passed. 
VAGO, supra note 201, at 184; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE 
847 2008] WHY VIEWING A CRIME SCENE SHOULD BE CRIMINAL 
statutory interpretation.204 The primary debate within the field of 
statutory interpretation concerns what sources may be considered 
in identifying the intent of the legislature that passed the statute. 
Some legal scholars, notably originalists and textualists, argue that 
statutes should be interpreted as a reasonable person would con­
strue their meaning, using only the words on the page.205 Other 
scholars believe that multiple sources, particularly legislative his­
tory, can assist an interpreter in discerning the intent of the legisla­
ture.206 While scholars debate textualism, intentionalism, and the 
other "isms" that govern statutory interpretation, courts generally 
"qualify the deference they pay to the statutory text by their will­
ingness to use some evidence outside the text to establish legislative 
intent. "207 
AGE OF STATUTES 32 (1982) (explaining that vagueness in statutes "will frequently be a 
prerequisite to obtaining approval from all the groups that could block enactment"); 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 201, at 38 ("[F]or any statute of consequence, the legislative 
drafting process ensures textual ambiguities, which only multiply over time."); HURST, 
supra note 199, at 55 (noting that judges do not look to legislative intent unless the 
language of the statute is unclear). 
204. Statutory interpretation, from how-to to pros and cons, is the topic of count­
less books and articles. For more thorough analyses, see, for example, ESKRIDGE, supra 
note 201; ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY (1992); V AGO, 
supra note 201; ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITU­
TIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). 
205. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, an outspoken originalist and textual­
ist, described his philosophy as follows: 
[N]either the statements of individual Members of Congress (ordinarily ad­
dressed to a virtually empty floor), nor Executive statements and letters ad­
dressed to congressional committees, nor the nonenactment of other proposed 
legislation, is a reliable indication of what a majority of both Houses of Con­
gress intended when they voted for the statute before us. The only reliable 
indication of that intent-the only thing we know for sure can be attributed to 
all of them-is the words of the bill that they voted to make law. 
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,390-91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concur­
ring) (citations omitted); see also VERMEULE, supra note 204, at 183 (writing that, when 
a statute is ambiguous, "[t]he tools that should be excluded from the judicial kit-bag 
include legislative history [and] many of the canons of construction"). Contra Es­
KRIDGE, supra note 201, at 38 (arguing that "[t]he new textualist position is that statu­
tory text is the most determinate basis for statutory interpretation. That proposition ... 
is questionable"). 
206. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 201, at 49 (claiming that dynamic statutory inter­
pretation, rather than static statutory interpretation, allows for statutes to evolve so that 
they fit "fact situations well into the future"). Eskridge argues that interpreters, in ad­
dition to looking at the plain meaning and the legislative intent, should also examine 
"the facts and equities of the case, precedents interpreting the statute and legislative 
feedback, and the consequences of accepting one interpretation over another." Id. at 
47. 
207. HURST, supra note 199, at 53. 
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Although courts will examine external sources in construing 
the meaning of an ambiguous criminal statute, the rule of lenity 
requires that the statute be interpreted in favor of the defendant.208 
This canon of construction is intended to "guarantee that courts will 
go no further than the legislature intended in interpreting criminal 
prohibitions.''209 Because the rule of lenity exists to prevent a de­
fendant from being convicted of a crime he might not have known 
he was committing, it only applies when a statute is ambiguous on 
its face.2iO Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated 
that the rule of lenity applies when "an ordinary person reading the 
statute" would "be surprised to learn" that a specific act he had 
committed is criminal under that statute.211 
2. 	 The Massachusetts Statute that Governs Statutory 
Interpretation 
In Massachusetts, statutory interpretation is governed by both 
statute and case law. The statute governing statutory construction 
lists eleven rules, prefaced by the instruction that the "rules shall be 
observed, unless their observance would involve a construction in­
consistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body."2i2 The 
only section applicable to the interpretation of the Massachusetts 
child pornography possession statute is the fair import provision213 
that specifies that "[w]ords and phrases shall be construed accord­
208. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (explaining that the rule of 
lenity only applies to ambiguous statutes). But cf Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as 
a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,910 (2004) (arguing that many courts no 
longer follow the rule of lenity because its dual purpose of ensuring notice and legisla­
tive supremacy has not held up over the years). 
209. Price, supra note 208, at 886; see also DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 48-49. 
210. See Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 688 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Mass. 1998) ("As is well 
established, however, criminal statutes must be construed strictly against the Common­
wealth. This does not mean that we read unambiguous statutory language to favor 
defendants; it means simply that ... ambiguity must be resolved in favor of a defen­
dant." (citations omitted»; see also DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 49; 3 SINGER, supra 
note 199, § 59:3, at 142 (6th ed. 2001) ("Strict construction is a means of assuring fair­
ness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequiv­
ocal warning in language that people generally would understand, concerning actions 
that would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be." 
(citations omitted». 
211. See Perry v. Commonwealth, 780 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Mass. 2002) (holding that a 
defendant convicted of dissemination of child pornography should have known that 
computer-stored images would be included within the legislature's definition of visual 
materials). 
212. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (2006). 
213. Id. One author argues that this fair import provision specifically encourages 
courts to interpret statutes broadly. Price, supra note 208, at 886. 
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ing to the common and approved usage of the language; but techni­
cal words and phrases and such others as may have acquired a 
peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be construed and un­
derstood according to such meaning. "214 The statute thus requires 
that the plain meaning of the statute prevail unless the legislature 
may have intended a specific legal definition of a particular word. 
3. Massachusetts Case Law on Statutory Interpretation 
Massachusetts case law highlights the importance of construing 
the words within the statute by their plain meaning. Again and 
again, however, the cases declare that an interpreter cannot truly 
understand the plain meaning without identifying the legislature's 
intent in passing the law. For example, in the 1931 criminal case of 
Commonwealth v. Welosky,215 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court stated: 
The words of a statute are the main source for the ascertainment 
of a legislative purpose. . . . Statutes are to be interpreted, not 
alone according to their simple, literal or strict verbal meaning, 
but in connection with their development, their progression 
through the legislative body, the history of the times, prior legis­
lation ... and, on the other hand, be not stretched by enlargement 
ofsignification to comprehend matters not within the principle and 
purview on which they were founded when originally framed and 
their words chosen.216 
In 1946, the court declared, "[t]he legislative intent in enacting a 
statute is to be gathered from a consideration of the words in which 
it is couched, giving to them their ordinary meaning unless there is 
something in the statute indicating that they should have a different 
significance."217 These cases suggest that the words have no plain 
meaning until the legislative intent has been determined. 
214. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6. The remaining rules govern, for example, how 
to interpret repealed statutes, standards for newspaper publication when required by 
statute, and how plurals, singulars, and gender-specific pronouns should be interpreted. 
/d. 
215. Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177 N.E. 656 (Mass. 1931). 
216. Id. at 658-59 (emphasis added); see also Hanlon v. Rollins, 190 N.E. 606, 608 
(Mass. 1934) ("The general and familiar rule is that a statute must be interpreted accord­
ing to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all the words construed by the ordi­
nary and approved usage of the language ... to the end that the purpose of its framers 
may be effectuated." (emphasis added)). 
217. Meunier's Case, 66 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Mass. 1946) (emphasis added); see also 
Sullivan v. Town of Brookline, 758 N.E.2d 110, 115 (Mass. 2001) ("A fundamental tenet 
of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent 
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Massachusetts case law recognizes the essential principle of 
statutory construction that determining the plain meaning of the 
words is the first, and often the only, step.218 However, the deter­
mination of what the words mean must be done through the lens of 
the intent of the legislature. The case law establishes that "some­
thing in the statute" can render ambiguous words that would other­
wise appear clear.219 The limiting factor in interpretation is that the 
matters covered by the statute must be "within their principle and 
purview."22o When viewed alongside the statutory cannon of con­
struction requiring that words must be construed by their plain 
meaning unless the result contradicts the intent of the legislature, it 
is clear that a statute can only be fairly applied once the purpose of 
the legislature is identified and the words are interpreted to achieve 
that purpose.221 Consequently, the plain meaning of the statute is 
unascertainable without an understanding of the purpose for which 
the statute was enacted. 
VI. ANALYSIS: INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION 

OF SECTION 29C 

In Massachusetts, section 29C of chapter 272 prohibits the 
knowing purchase and possession of child pornography.222 The fol­
lowing analysis concludes that the Massachusetts legislature in­
tended to punish those who view child pornography. Yet, as the 
statute currently reads, those who merely view online pornography 
in Massachusetts are not violating the law and, consequently, can­
not be convicted. 
with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would 
achieve an illogical result." (emphasis added». 
218. See Pyle v. Sch. Comm. of S. Hadley, 667 N.E.2d 869, 871-72 (Mass. 1996). 
The court explained how Massachusetts has interpreted the plain-meaning rule: 
Our primary duty is to interpret a statute in accordance with the intent of the 
Legislature. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent. Where the ordinary meaning of the statu­
tory terms yields a workable result, we need not resort to extrinsic aids of 
interpretation such as legislative history. We accord the words of the statute 
their ordinary meanings, however, with due regard to the statute's purposes. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
219. Meunier's Case, 66 N.E.2d at 200. 
220. Welosky, 177 N.E. at 658-59. 
221. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (2006). 
222. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29C (2006); see also supra note 12. 
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A. Interpreting Section 29C 
Although the legislative history of section 29C does not specify 
why the legislature added section 1,223 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court has referred to the section as "legislative 'find­
ings."'224 The legislature may have added the section so that its 
intent could not be contested.225 Likewise, it may have included it 
in reaction to the public outcry at that time over the violent death 
of Jeffrey Curley at the hands of a man who possessed child pornog­
raphy.226 Regardless of the reason for its inclusion, the findings 
provide insight into the intent of the legislature in passing the bill 
and, thus, are indispensable in the interpretation of the statute.227 
The inclusion of the findings has a two-fold impact on the in­
terpretation of the statute. First, it eliminates the need to look at 
extrinsic materials to determine the intent of the legislature because 
the findings specify the intent. Ironically, however, the second im­
pact is that the findings render the statute ambiguous. Had the leg­
islature not included its findings, it would be difficult to make an 
argument that the legislative history-or any other sources availa­
ble228-should be examined because the plain meaning of the 
223. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C (West 2000); see supra note 187 and 
accompanying text. 
224. Perry v. Commonwealth, 780 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Mass. 2002) (holding that the 
legislative findings of section 29C do not apply to section 31). Legislative findings are 
not commonly included in Massachusetts statutes. Fewer than ten Massachusetts stat­
utes explicitly include findings. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 
2000) (governing the protection of works of fine art); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, 
§ 14F (governing contributions to the Unemployment Trust Fund). 
225. Evidence of how the court has perceived the legislature's intent when it has 
included such statements in other statutes is found in Moakley v. Eastwick, in which the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court looked to a similar inclusion to determine the 
"primary goal of the Act." Moakley v. Eastwick, 666 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 1996). 
Again, in Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board, the court found that "[t]he purpose is 
affirmatively supported by expressed legislative findings," followed by a footnote that 
reprinted those findings verbatim. Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 857 N.E.2d 473, 
480 (Mass. 2006). 
226. See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text. 
227. See 2A SINGER, supra note 199, § 46:5 ("A statute is passed as a whole and 
not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Conse­
quently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or 
section to produce a harmonious whole."). 
228. See Spencer A. Stone, Note, What Was Congress Smoking? The Uncertain 
Distinction Between "Cocaine" and "Cocaine Base" in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of1986, 
30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 297, 336 (2007) (suggesting that "to determine the intent of 
Congress in passing a statute, it is proper to consider almost any source that can provide 
guidance on the subject"). But cf VERMEULE, supra note 204, at 35 (arguing that even 
those who believe that the intent of the legislature ought to be determined by looking at 
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words is clear.229 A legislature that criminalizes the possession of 
child pornography could intend to do only that. What creates ambi­
guity in section 29C is that the conduct that the legislature prohibits 
does not eliminate the harms that the legislature has identified. 
According to the second finding, "the mere possession or con­
trol of any sexually exploitative material results in continuing vic­
timization of children."23o Further, "each time such material is 
viewed the child is harmed."231 Regarding possession specifically, 
the legislature provided "that to stop the sexual abuse and exploita­
tion of children, it is necessary to ban the possession of any sexually 
exploitative materials."232 Finally, the legislature claimed that "the 
Commonwealth has a compelling interest in outlawing the posses­
sion of any materials which sexually exploit children in order to 
protect the privacy, health and emotional welfare of children and 
society as a whole."233 The prohibitions that derive naturally from 
these findings are those that are expressly stated as behaviors that 
harm children-possession, control, and viewing. Yet, of these 
three, the legislature only prohibited possession.234 
The legislative history of section 29C includes no discussion 
about the inclusion of the findings within the statute235 or why cer­
tain behaviors were criminalized and others not. The legislature 
sources extrinsic to the statute itself would argue against "collecting and reviewing all 
possible evidence of original understandings or intentions"). 
229. HURST, supra note 199, at 55 (explaining that an argument could never be 
made that a statute is unclear because its legislative history conflicts with its plain mean­
ing, and stating that "the rule makes a showing of uncertainty on the face of the statute 
an absolute prerequisite to looking beyond the face"); see also Rubin v. United States, 
449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) ("When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial 
inquiry is complete."); MARMOR, supra note 204, at 55 (noting that judges will not turn 
to extrinsic evidence to discern legislative intent unless the statutory text is ambiguous); 
VERMEULE, supra note 204, at 30 ("Few if any people think that the legislative history is 
'authoritative' in the sense that it is itself a source of law that is hierarchically superior 
even to unambiguous text."). 
230. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C (West 2000). The section reads: "that 
the mere possession or control of any sexually exploitative material results in continu­
ing victimization of children as such material is a permanent record of an act or acts of 
sexual abuse or exploitation of a child and that each time such material is viewed the 
child is harmed." Id. 
231. !d. (emphasis added). 
232. Id. § 1(5). 
233. Id. § 1(6). 
234. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29C (2006) ("Whoever knowingly purchases or 
possesses a negative, slide, book, magazine, film, videotape, photograph or other similar 
visual reproduction, or depiction by computer, of any child whom the person knows or 
reasonably should know to be under the age of 18 years of age."). 
235. In fact, the first time the findings appear in the legislative history is in the 
session in which they were accepted. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 185. 
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may have had a variety of reasons for electing to crirninalize only 
possession and not control or viewing. For example, despite the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Osborne that a prohibition on possession 
and viewing is not unconstitutional, the legislature may have been 
unsettled by the prohibition's intrusion into the privacy of personal 
possession.236 The legislature also may have had reservations about 
how a prohibition on viewing could be enforced since it is highly 
unlikely that the police would actually observe the viewer during 
the commission of the crime.237 
It is also plausible that the legislature understood the act of 
viewing as harmful conduct included within the purview of posses­
sion and, accordingly, as conduct that could not occur without the 
viewer being in possession of the material he was viewing. It is 
likely that the legislature was responding to the videotapes that the 
judge returned to the convicted child pornographer and the materi­
als that were found in the apartment of Jeffrey Curley's murderer. 
Viewing these tangible materials assumes possession of them be­
cause they are actual objects. Of course, as Justice Brennan noted 
in Osborne, a person can view images in an art gallery without pos­
sessing them.238 Likewise, a person could view a videotape of child 
pornography that he does not possess. However, the distinction be­
tween a videotape and an online image is that someone possesses 
the videotape. Someone can be convicted of possession, and the 
videotape can be seized, never to be viewed again. The Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court construed the legislature's "expressed 
design" to be "to eliminate permanent records of sexually exploi­
tive material harmful to children."239 Because an online image ex­
ists only when a person is looking at it on a screen, to cause harm to 
the child depicted in it, it must be viewed.240 The elimination of the 
record of online child pornography, then, requires that it never be 
viewed. 
236. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 148 (1990). "Mr. Osborne's pictures may be 
distasteful, but the Constitution guarantees both his right to possess them privately and 
his right to avoid punishment under an overbroad law." Id. at 148 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
237. In New Jersey, the prosecution has proved viewing by the contents of the 
computer cache. See State v. Tanner, No. 03-06-128-S, 2007 WL 2239184, *3 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2007) (per curiam). In Osborne, Justice Brennan ex­
pressed concern about the difficulty of enforcing a prohibition on possession given the 
need for probable cause and a warrant. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 142 n.l7 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); see also Caughlan, supra note 69, at 187. 
238. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 138 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
239. Commonwealth v. Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067, 1074 (Mass. 2002) 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34. 
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Moreover, because the legislature identified each act as a sepa­
rate behavior within its findings, an argument that possession natu­
rally encompasses control and viewing fails. First, the findings refer 
to "mere possession," meaning "nothing more than" possession.241 
Second, if possession subsumed control and viewing, the legislature 
would not have stated "possession or control." It would have sepa­
rated the words with "and" to signify that each requires the other to 
create the harmful behavior. The "or" demonstrates the legisla­
ture's recognition that each is a distinctly harmful behavior. 
Despite the incongruity that leads to textual ambiguity be­
tween the findings and the prohibited acts, the intent of the legisla­
ture is clear. By outlawing the possession of child pornography, it 
sought "to protect children from sexual exploitation" and "to pro­
tect the privacy, health and emotional welfare of children and soci­
ety as a whole."242 If, at the time the bill was passed, the legislature 
primarily understood viewing only to occur in conjunction with pos­
session-possession of a photograph or a videotape, for example­
the fact that it did not include viewing as a criminal act is under­
standable.243 Now, however, viewing can and does occur indepen­
dently of possession.244 In fact, materials can exist solely as objects 
to be viewed and not possessed. For example, "the exploitative 
uses for interactive CD-ROM and videoconferencing technology 
are obvious."245 Under the current statute, the viewing of such a 
"videoconference" is unquestionably legal. Yet, surely the Massa­
chusetts legislature would find that the viewing of a real-time vide­
oconference of the sexual exploitation of a child is harmful and 
violates "the privacy, health and emotional welfare" of the child.246 
241. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S, supra note 15, at 777. 
242. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C (West 2000); see Commonwealth v. 
Kenney, 874 N.E.2d 1089, 1101 (Mass. 2007). 
243. But see Price, supra note 208, at 931. Regarding the application of the stat­
ute to new technologies, one author commented that "[i]t is indeed remarkable that 
Massachusetts did not specifically criminalize computerized child pornography as late 
as 1998" in reference to the types of "visual material" that are specifically prohibited in 
Massachusetts. Id. It is also useful to note here that in 2006, 73% of Americans, or 147 
million adults, reported using the Internet. In 1998, however, one year after the passage 
of section 29C, just over 35% of Americans reported using the Internet. Mary Madden, 
Internet Penetration and Impact 2006, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, Apr. 2006, 
at 3, available at http://www.pewinternet.org!pdfs/PIP_Internet_Impact.pdf. 
244. This is evidenced by the statutes that criminalize viewing as a distinct act 
from possession. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-27-304(a)(2) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:24-4(5)(b) (West 2005); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.323 (West 2006). 
245. Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 432. 
246. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C. 
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An added risk of a possession-only prohibition is that the list of 
what may not be possessed will require amending each time a new 
technology is developed.247 The Massachusetts Superior Court ad­
dressed a similar issue in Commonwealth v. Gousie, when it sug­
gested that if the court gave in to the defendant's insistence that 
each unique form of visual material be specified within the statute, 
"the result would be that every technological advance could not be 
recognized by a court without benefit of a legislative response in 
the nature of a special statutory amendment."248 The court's hold­
ing presumes that all forms of child pornography can somehow be 
possessed.249 Yet, it is not difficult to imagine a defendant claiming 
rightfully that he did not possess an online videoconference live 
feed of a child in the act of being sexually exploited.250 What all 
forms of child pornography do have in common, however, is that a 
defendant can view them. 
247. See Howell, supra note 101, at 115. 
Changes are already developing in P2P networks to get around the liability 
risks of possessing and distributing illegal material. One such system involves 
encrypting the files that a user wants to share, pushing the encrypted files onto 
another client machine, and then making the decryption key available at web 
sites only accessible to Freenet users, along with pointers to where the mate­
rial may be found. The keys are distributed, not the material, and the person 
in possession of the encrypted material has deniability about what the subject 
matter of the encrypted file is. Some in law enforcement are already anticipat­
ing a need for new laws to make it illegal to possess a deliberately stored decryp­
tion key that the user knows relates to an illegal file. 
Id. (emphasis added); cf Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 671 
(2004) (noting that the five-year-old factual record of the case no longer "reflect[ed] 
current technological reality. . . . The technology of the Internet evolves at a rapid 
pace"). 
248. Commonwealth v. Gousie, No. BRCR2001-0115-1-6, 2001 WL 1153462, at 
*4 (Mass. Sept. 26, 2001). But see Perry v. Commonwealth, 780 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Mass. 
2002) (noting the amendments the legislature has made to the definition of "visual ma­
terial" in child pornography statutes to stay current with technology). 
249. Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (Klein, 
J., dissenting) (writing that "[i]f the legislature fails to keep up with modern technology, 
it is not our responsibility to correct its oversight"), appeal granted, 939 A.2d 290 (Pa. 
2007); see also Howell, supra note 101, at 15. 
250. See Eichenwald, supra note 19. 
The [child pornography] business has created youthful Internet pornography 
stars-with nicknames like Riotboyy, Miss Honey and Gigglez-whose images 
are traded online long after their sites have vanished. In this world, adoles­
cents announce schedules of their next masturbation for customers who pay 
fees for the performance or monthly subscription charges. Eager customers 
can even buy "private shows," in which teenagers sexually perform while fol­
lowing real-time instructions. 
Id. 
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Thus, while there may be valid reasons why the legislature de­
cided to criminalize only purchase and possession, and not control 
or viewing, the result is that it created a statute that does not pro­
hibit all of the conduct that the statute specifically claims harms 
children. The stated legislative intent of "protect[ing] the privacy, 
health and emotional welfare of children and society as a whole" 
cannot be achieved under the statute as it currently reads. Given 
the findings that the legislature has presented-that a child is 
harmed each time material is viewed-the emotional welfare of the 
child victim is not protected by prohibiting only possession of the 
material. The harm continues, according to the legislature, with 
each viewing. 
B. Challenging the Massachusetts Statute 
Since the enactment of section 29C in 1997, three cases have 
challenged its validity.251 Although all three defendants were ulti­
mately convicted, the cases demonstrate the manipulability of a 
possession-only statute. Both Hinds and Kenney were ultimately 
decided in the highest court of Massachusetts. If section 29C pro­
hibited viewing child pornography, the issues raised by those de­
fendants would have been moot, and the cases would likely have 
terminated in the courts in which they originated. 
In Commonwealth v. Gousie, the defendant emailed several 
images of child pornography from his own computer.252 He was 
charged with violating section 29C.253 Gousie claimed that his con­
duct was insufficient to show that he ever possessed the images be­
cause, he argued, "computer transmitted images are not 'visual 
material' under the statute" and thus cannot be possessed.254 The 
trial court disagreed, stating that the legislature's inclusion of "de­
piction by computer" within the statute proves that it intended that 
computer images be capable of possession.255 The court further 
found that the legislature's preamble "is evocative that the Legisla­
ture intended that computer images depicting sexual exploitation of 
children should be excluded from the Commonwealth in all 
251. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 874 N.E.2d 1089 (Mass. 2007); Commonwealth v. 
Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067, 1073 (Mass. 2002); Gousie, 2001 WL 1153462. 
252. Gousie, 2001 WL 1153462, at *1. 
253. /d. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. (discussing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29C (2000)). Because Gousie 
had e-mailed an image, there was no issue of whether he had the required mens rea of 
knowing possession. Id. 
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forms. "256 Cousie was the first articulation from a Massachusetts 
court that computer images are capable of being possessed. 
One year later, in Commonwealth v. Hinds, the defendant 
claimed that the possession statute referred only to tangible 
items.257 Again, the court disagreed, stating, "the Legislature's cre­
ation of a separate and distinct category for 'depiction by computer' 
manifests an intent to give special treatment to the unique issues 
presented by computers, including the fact that stored data, al­
though intangible in their unprocessed form, are readily transfer­
rable to a graphic image."258 Here, although the court found that 
the statute includes images that a defendant has saved onto his hard 
drive, the court did not address images that are saved automatically 
to the cache. Thus, although the court had again concluded that 
computer images can be knowingly possessed, it did not address the 
issue of whether such materials can be knowingly possessed if the 
defendant is unaware that his computer automatically saved them 
while he was viewing them.259 
Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Kenney, the defendant 
challenged the constitutionality of section 29C.260 Arguing that the 
statute was overbroad and vague, the defendant claimed that his 
First Amendment rights had been violated when he was charged 
with possession of child pornography.261 Relying on New York v. 
Ferber262 and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,263 the court found 
his claims to be without merit.264 The court also specified that the 
defendant-like Gousie and Hinds before him-was challenging 
only "the scope of the proscribed material" and not the prohibited 
acts of purchase or possession.265 
None of these cases raised the issues presented in other juris­
dictions regarding whether a defendant can be convicted of know­
ing possession of images in a computer cache if he was unaware of 
256. Id. at *4. 
257. Commonwealth v. Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067, 1074 (Mass. 2002). 
258. Id. 
259. Cf United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
although defendant did not purposely save or download images, his computer automati­
cally saved previously viewed images without his knowledge). 
260. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 874 N.E.2d 1089, 1093 (Mass. 2007). 
261. Id. at 1096. 
262. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); see also supra notes 23-28 and 
accompanying text. 
263. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); see also supra note 22. 
264. Kenney, 874 N.E.2d at 1097-102 (discussing Ferber and Ashcroft). 
265. Id. at 1104. 
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their existence.266 Nor did the cases address whether the prosecu­
tion had proved constructive possession.267 Thus, the Massachu­
setts courts have yet to rule on whether a defendant in 
Massachusetts can knowingly possess images on his hard drive that 
he did not actively save. 
C. 	 Applying the Massachusetts Standard for Constructive 
Possession to Online Child Pornography Images 
Because the child pornography statute in Massachusetts pro­
hibits only knowing purchase and possession, and not control or 
viewing, a prosecutor would likely claim that a viewing defendant, 
who was unaware of the saved images in his cache, had constructive 
possession of the images. 
1. 	 The Constructive Possession Standard 
Unlike the constructive possession standards in Virginia, Ala­
bama, and Washington,268 the Massachusetts constructive posses­
sion standard includes a requirement of intent. As described in an 
illegal possession of adult pornography case, "[c]onstructive posses­
sion exists when a person has no present personal dominion over an 
item but has the intent and capability to maintain such domin­
ion."269 The definition thus requires that a person have the ability 
and the intent to control the item.27o This additional element of 
266. See, e.g., United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bass, 411 
F.3d 1198, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 
2002). Although Stuart Romm was a Massachusetts resident and practicing attorney, 
he was tried by the federal court in Las Vegas for violating the federal child pornogra­
phy statute. He was ultimately disbarred by the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers. 
See In re Romm, No. BD-1998-027, 1999 WL 33721622 (Mass. State Bar Dispute Bd. 
Nov. 3, 1999). 
267. See, e.g., Ward v. State, No. CR-05-1277, 2007 WL 1228169 (Ala. Crim. App. 
Apr. 27, 2007) (per curiam); Kromer v. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d 871 (Va. Ct. App. 
2005); State v. Mobley, 118 P.3d 413 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
268. 	 See supra notes 136-156. 
269. Commonwealth v. Lotten Books, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Mass. 1981) 
(emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Nichols, 356 N.E.2d 464, 471 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1976)). 
270. Capability is "ability." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S, supra note 15, at 182. The 
general definition of "ability" is "the quality or state of being able." Id. at 3. Its legal 
definition is "[t]he capacity to perform an act or service." BLACK'S, supra note 88, at 4. 
Dominion is "control, possession." Id. at 525. Intent is "[t]he state of mind accompa­
nying an act, esp. a forbidden act." !d. at 825. The definition goes on to specify that 
"[w]hile motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or 
determination to do it." Id. 
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intent creates an obstacle for a prosecutor, who must attempt to 
prove that the defendant, while viewing the images, intended to 
control them. Given that many defendants argue that they specifi­
cally did not save, download, e-mail, or otherwise possess the 
images precisely because they did not intend to control them,271 the 
prosecution will have to convince the court to find intent in the 
defendant's ability to control.272 
2. Constructive Possession Precedent in Massachusetts 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explored the con­
structive possession standard in the context of illegal possession of 
adult pornography in Commonwealth v. Lotten Books, Inc.,273 a 
1981 case in which a bookstore cashier and the bookstore as a cor­
porate defendant were found guilty of possession with intent to dis­
seminate obscene films. Lotten Books, Inc. had private booths in 
which customers could view pornographic films by inserting coins 
into a projector.274 The bookstore cashier, Albert Pulli, who was in 
charge at the time the police came into the store, did not have keys 
to the cabinets that held the projectors.275 However, he knew how 
to contact the store owner who had the keys, and he was staffing 
the store so that customers could come in to view the films.276 
The court recognized that it could not find Pulli guilty of pos­
session because, with no key, he did not have access to the films.277 
However, it stated that the proper definition of possession that con­
trolled in this case should be "a definition which will best reflect the 
intent of the Legislature."278 The legislature'S intent, it held, was 
not to permit a defendant to evade a charge of possession by keep­
ing keys to the locked illegal matter off the premises.279 Rather, the 
271. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002). 
272. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Mobley and 
the totality of the circumstances test); see also State v. Mobley, 118 P.3d 413 (Wash. Ct. 
App.2005). 
273. Lotten Books, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 145. The bookstore and its manager, Albert 
Pulli, were codefendants in Lotten Books, Inc. Id. at 147. 
274. ld. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 149. 
277. Id. at 148-49 ("The fact that Pulli could gain access to the compartments by 
the mere expedient of a phone call to someone who produced the keys supports a find­
ing of at least constructive possession."). 
278. Id. at 149. 
279. Id. ("A person cannot thwart the intent of the statute by placing the contra­
band in a locked compartment and then entrusting the keys to another party."). 
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intent was to reach a defendant who had the intent and the ability 
to exercise dominion and control over the illegal matter.280 Pulli's 
intent was apparent because he worked in a bookstore that sold 
obscene literature and showed adult pornographic movies. His 
ability was demonstrated by his knowledge of whom to call to get 
the keys. Consequently, the court convicted him of constructive 
possession.281 
D. 	 A Defendant Who Is Unaware of the Cache Would Not Be 
Convicted of Possession of Child Pornography Under the 
Massachusetts Statute 
1. Possession 
If a defendant appeared before a Massachusetts court charged 
with possession of child pornography, the prosecution would have 
to prove both that he possessed it and that he knew that he pos­
sessed it. For a defendant who was unaware of the existence of the 
cache and merely viewed the images online, the court should find 
that ignorance of the cache precludes a finding of knowing posses­
sion.282 The mens rea of "knowing" requires that the defendant be 
"conscious and aware of [his act]" and "realize[] what [he is] do­
ing."283 He must be "aware that his conduct is of that nature or that 
such circumstances exist."284 If the defendant is unaware that the 
images remained on his computer after he viewed them, the prose­
cution cannot prove that he intended to save and consequently pos­
sess them there. The court should find that he does not possess 
them. 
A prosecutor could attempt to prove that the defendant knew 
of the cache under the doctrine of willful blindness. Although 
280. 	 Id. 
281. The court distinguished its holding in Lotten Books, Inc. from the Supreme 
Court's holding in 1914 that "possession of a locked trunk does not give rise to posses­
sion of its contents." Id. at 149 n.9 (claiming that in National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 
the Supreme Court overstated the proposition that the possession of a locked trunk 
does not automatically infer possession of what is inside the trunk (citing National Safe 
Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 68 (1914), which construed Bottom v. Clarke, 61 
Mass. (7 Cush.) 487 (1851))). It claimed that the Supreme Court's holding was only 
relevant for a situation in which the alleged possessor could not "lawfully" open a 
locked compartment holding the illegal matter. Id. (emphasis added). Here, because 
Pulli as the bookstore manager could lawfully open the cabinets with a key, the Massa­
chusetts court found that the Supreme Court's holding did not apply. See id. 
282. 	 See, e.g., United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002). 
283. 	 2 MASS. JURY INSTRUcnONS, supra note 91, § 4.12. 
284. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 88, § 2.02(b)(i); see also DRESSLER, supra 
note 8, at 126. 
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knowledge is a requirement both in section 29C and in the defini­
tion of constructive possession, Massachusetts includes the doctrine 
of "willful blindness" within its definition of "knowingly." Willful 
blindness "generally exists if the actor is aware of a high probability 
of the existence of the fact in question, and he deliberately fails to 
investigate in order to avoid confirmation of the fact."285 In Massa­
chusetts, a fact finder may determine that a defendant who claims 
that he had no knowledge did in fact have knowledge if "'the facts 
suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance.' "286 Thus, the 
prosecution would have to prove that the defendant suspected that 
his computer was saving the images and purposely did not attempt 
to learn how his computer works. Complete ignorance, however, is 
not willful blindness. 
2. Constructive Possession 
The prosecution would then turn to constructive possession, 
which requires proof that, although the defendant did not actually 
possess the images, he had the ability and intent to control them. 
Regarding the ability to control, the court would likely find that the 
defendant was unaware of the cache, and thus had no ability to ac­
cess it. This would distinguish him from Pulli, who was aware of the 
obscene movies in the cabinet and knew how to access them.287 
However, the court may consider the defendant's ability to control 
the images while he was viewing them, notwithstanding his inability 
to control images saved in his cache. This interpretation would mir­
ror that of the majority in Commonwealth v. Diodoro,288 which 
held that a defendant's unexercised ability to control the images 
285. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 136-37. 
286. Commonwealth v. Mimless, 760 N.E.2d 762, 772 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) 
(quoting United States v. Hogan, 861 F.2d 312, 316 (1st Cir. 1988)). The Mimless court 
approved of a trial judge's instruction to the jury that it could find the defendant guilty 
if it found that he "deliberately closed his eyes as to what would have been obvious to 
him." Id. at 772 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Massachusetts's most nota­
ble willful blindness case, prison guards knew that a chemical used to clean the toilets 
inside the cells was poisonous. They also knew that prisoners, in emptying their own 
portable toilets into clogged sinks, were in daily contact with the chemical and the waste 
from their own and other inmates' toilets. Ahearn v. Vose, 833 N.E.2d 659, 662-63 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005). However, the guards were found not to have actual knowledge 
or willful blindness of inhumane prison conditions. Id. at 669. Despite the guards' 
knowledge of the danger of the chemical and the fact of its proximity to the prisoners, 
the court found that they were unaware, at least legally, that the prisoners were in 
harm's way. Id. 
287. Commonwealth v. Lotten Books, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Mass. 1981). 
288. See supra notes 157-166 and accompanying text. 
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while he was viewing them was sufficient to find actual control of 
them.289 Of course, under the Massachusetts standard, the prosecu­
tion would additionally have to prove that he had intended to con­
trol the images while he was viewing them. 
Regarding the defendant's intent290 to control the images, his 
decision not to print, download, e-mail, or save them291 demon­
strates a lack of intent to control.292 Again, this distinguishes the 
defendant from Pulli293 (and from Diodoro ),294 where intent to 
control the contraband was demonstrated by the fact that the de­
fendant worked in the store that had private booths for viewing 
pornographic movies.295 Accordingly, the court should determine 
that the defendant had no constructive possession of the images in 
the cache. Based on the plain meaning of the statute, the court 
289. Although the Pennsylvania statute considered by the Diodoro court prohib­
its control of child pornography, the dissenting judge accused the majority of convicting 
the defendant of viewing because he had never actually controlled the images. Com­
monwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (Klein, J., dissenting), 
appeal granted, 939 A.2d 290 (Pa. 2007). 
290. In describing the inferences that a jury must draw to convict a defendant 
based on his intent, attorney and legal scholar James Marshall opined: 
If we know what a person wishes to happen, to occur (his motive), and that he 
has the capacity (the skill, strength, means) to accomplish it, and if he has the 
opportunity, we infer that he will try. Therefore we say he intends to act to 
bring about the happening, the occurrence, and therefore that he is responsi­
ble if it occurs. 
JAMES MARSHALL, INTENTION-IN LAW AND SOCIETY 137 (1968). This description of 
intent assumes within it motive and ability. The Diodoro majority, on the other hand, 
seemed to define intent to control as solely a desire on the part of the defendant to see 
the photographs. The court stated parenthetically, "[aJ showing that a defendant was 
aware of the presence of the article that constitutes contraband established an intent to 
exercise control over such contraband." Diodoro, 932 A.2d at 174 (citing Common­
wealth v. Armstead, 305 A.2d 1, 2 (1973». 
291. See United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2005) (Kelly, J., 
dissenting) (describing the ways in which a defendant can indicate knowing possession). 
292. Another factor, raised by the dissent in United States v. Gourde, is the basic 
tenet that "[cJommon sense suggests that everyone, pervert or not, has the desire to stay 
out of jail. ... It would be irrational to assume that an individual is indifferent between 
subjecting himself to criminal sanctions and avoiding them, when he can attain his ob­
ject while avoiding them." United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Applied here, the defendant specifically did not 
take affirmative action to place the images in his possession because he knew that, 
although viewing was legal, possession was not. 
293. Commonwealth v. Lotten Books, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 145 (Mass. 1981); see 
supra notes 269-278 and accompanying text. 
294. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172; see supra notes 157-166 and accompanying text. 
295. Lotten Books, Inc., 428 N.E.2d at 147; see supra notes 269-278 and accompa­
nying text. 
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should end its deliberations at this point and find the defendant not 
guilty of knowing possession of child pornography. 
E. If the Legislature Intended It, Can't the Court Just Do It? 
On its face, section 29C does not punish viewing.296 In Com­
monwealth v. Kenney, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
stated of section 29C, "[w]e presume that the Legislature, at the 
time of the statute's enactment in 1997, knew of preexisting law and 
of the decisions of our court and the United States Supreme Court, 
and intended the statutory language to be interpreted consistent 
with those statutes and decisions."297 This presumption, as well as 
the plain-meaning rule of statutory interpretation,298 forbids a court 
from inferring meaning into the unambiguous words of a statute. 
Although viewing child pornography is undoubtedly within the 
findings as a harmful act, the only expressly prohibited act is 
possesslOn. 
Accordingly, in situations where a defendant has only viewed 
the material, courts will be forced either to follow the plain lan­
guage of the statute and acquit299 or to stretch the definition of pos­
session to encompass an act that the statute clearly does not reach. 
Although some courts have manipulated possession statutes "be­
yond their reasonable import to accomplish a result not ex­
296. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
states that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Due process includes the right of 
every defendant to have each element of a crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Accordingly, for a court to convict a defendant 
under a statute that requires knowing possession, it must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant possessed the contraband and knew that he possessed it. To 
convict a defendant of possessing child pornography that he was looking at online, the 
court must "conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knowingly pos­
sessed the pornographic images which were found on the computer hard drive." Bass, 
411 F.3d at 1201. Given that the defendants in these cases were unaware of the cache 
and how to access it, the court cannot find the element of knowing possession beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
297. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 874 N.E.2d 1089, 1100 (Mass. 2007). 
298. For a discussion of the plain-meaning rule, see supra notes 199-202 and ac­
companying text. 
299. Some scholars argue that by literally interpreting a statute, notwithstanding 
an absurd or clearly wrongful result, a court "force[ s] the legislative hand." CALABRESI, 
supra note 203, at 34; see also Price, supra note 208, at 931 ("Ruling the other way in 
[the] case ... might have served to discipline legislators for failure to anticipate new 
criminal developments."). 
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pressed,"300 Massachusetts courts should heed the words of Judge 
Kleinfeld in United States v. Gourde, who wrote in his dissent: 
Though the spirit and purpose of the law is doubtless to stamp 
out the child pornography industry, criminal laws have no 
penumbras or emanations. There is no principle more essential 
to liberty, or more deeply imbued in our law, than that what is 
not prohibited, is permitted. That principle, and due process con­
cerns, are why criminal statutes are strictly construed; that is, '[a] 
criminal law is not to be read expansively to include what is not 
plainly embraced within the language of the statute.'301 
The conduct of defendants who view child pornography online may 
be reprehensible, immoral, and repulsive, but in Massachusetts, it is 
currently not illegal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts legislature passed section 29C of chapter 
272 of the Massachusetts General Laws, claiming "that laws ban­
ning the production and distribution of [sexually exploitative] mate­
rial are insufficient to halt this abuse and exploitation" and that 
banning possession was necessary "to stop the sexual abuse and ex­
ploitation of children."302 Banning possession, however, is only suf­
ficient when the defendant clearly possesses the images. 
In cases where possession is unclear, only an explicit prohibi­
tion against viewing will allow for a conviction. Although an in­
ternet user looking at a web page may lack the requisite awareness 
300. In re Bergeron, 107 N.E. 1007, 1008 (Mass. 1915); see, e.g., Bass, 411 F.3d 
1198; Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), appeal granted, 
932 A.2d 172 (Pa. 2007). But cf Moore v. State, 879 A.2d 1111 (Md. 2005). Moore held 
that "the plain language of the statutory terms 'to depict or describe' is unambiguous. 
The plain meaning of 'use a computer to depict or describe' is to use a computer to 
create, not to use a computer to download." Id. at 1118. Under this holding, the defen­
dant, whose child pornography included horrific images of preschool girls, was nonethe­
less correctly convicted of the misdemeanor of possession rather than the felony of 
production of child pornography. Id. at 1119. 
301. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. DeBella, 816 
N.E.2d 102, 106 (Mass. 2004) ("Close adherence to the language of a statute and its 
express exclusions is even more important where a defendant's freedom is involved and 
there are due process considerations."); Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and 
Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523, 1532 (2006) (noting that judges sometimes 
make decisions based on morality when "the obvious application of the obvious law will 
be obviously wrong-unjust, otherwise immoral, contrary to what any law maker could 
have wanted, contrary to a rule's purpose, or just plain stupid or absurd"). 
302. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C (West 2000). 
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that the page is saving to the computer's cache,303 there is no doubt 
that he is viewing that page. For viewing to occur, an image must 
exist. For an image to exist, a photograph must be taken of a child 
who is being sexually exploited. If a child is being sexually ex­
ploited in order for an image to exist for a person to view online, it 
is clear that the law banning only possession is insufficient to halt 
abuse and exploitation. If, as the Massachusetts legislature states, 
the act of viewing the image of a child in the moment of exploita­
tion harms that child, the legislature must expressly prohibit such 
viewing. It is the legislature's responsibility to amend section 29C 
to include viewing child pornography as a criminal act.304 
As possession statutes are currently interpreted, the conviction 
of the defendant rests on his technological savvy. The defendant's 
actions are the same in all of the cases-he has viewed child por­
nography online that has saved to his computer cache. In none of 
the cases has the defendant accessed the images on his cache. The 
defendants who are aware that these images are automatically 
saved are convicted. The defendants who are not aware are not. 
However, the defendant's knowledge of his cache is irrelevant to 
the child who is harmed by the viewing. Such harm includes not 
only a victim's knowledge of the photograph's existence and the 
crime that led to its creation, but also the fact that the image has 
become a cog in the child pornography machine that results in fur­
ther victimization of other children.305 Given the legislature's find­
ings, which include strong statements about the Commonwealth's 
compelling interest in ending the exploitation of children,306 it 
seems unlikely that the Massachusetts legislature truly intended 
that a child pornographer's conviction or acquittal should rest on 
his familiarity with how his computer works. 
303. See United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 2006); Bass, 411 
F.3d at 1207; United States v. Stu lock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002); Barton v. State, 
648 S.E.2d 660, 663 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1655, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 
622 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2007); Howard, supra note 98, at 1265. 
304. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier: Prospective Interpretations of 
Criminal Laws, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 725 (2007) ("The ideal of fair warning 
demands that the line between criminal and non-criminal conduct be clearly defined in 
advance. When legislatures fail to speak clearly, courts are left to clean up the mess."); 
see also Kreston, supra note 30, at 27 (suggesting that the federal statute either should 
be amended to prohibit viewing or that viewing "should be recognized as a necessary 
and sufficient condition of possession"). 
305. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. 
306. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C (West 2000). 
866 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:817 
The U.S. Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutional­
ity of the prohibition against viewing child pornography.307 The 
Massachusetts legislature now has an obligation to the children who 
are harmed each time their images are viewed to amend section 
29C to expressly prohibit the viewing of child pornography. 
Rebecca Michaels 
307. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
